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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the frequency of use and perceptions of usefulness of federal 
criminal justice information systems among state and local law enforcement personnel and 
certain IS environmental factors that affect usage.  The study is predicated by a demonstrated 
need for increased information sharing, interoperability, and collaboration among the three 
tiers of law enforcement as public safety threats within U.S. borders increase in complexity; 
e.g., the Murrah Federal Building bombing, Columbine High School shooting, 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, and D.C. sniper case.  The results of this research indicate high usage and perceived 
usefulness of the National Crime Information Center Network (NCIC Net), National Law 
Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS), Uniform Crime Reporting/National 
Incident Based Reporting System (UCR/NIBRS), National Instant Criminal Background 
Check System (NICS), and federal LE websites.  The results also indicated that the IS 
environmental factors information quality and trust influenced the usage and perceived 
usefulness of federal criminal justice information systems.   
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INFORMATION SHARING AND INTEROPERABILITY IN LAW ENFORCEMENT:  
AN INVESTIGATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION 
SYSTEMS USE BY STATE/LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ORGANIZATIONS. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
General Issue  
 The federal government has spent over $370B on software, computers, and 
infrastructure since the network boom began in 1993 (Puzzanghera, 2002).  Despite the 
quantity of monetary resources allocated to enhance information networks and 
information-sharing capabilities among governmental agencies over the past ten years, 
problems persist in creating a collaborative information-sharing environment in which 
essential information can be shared and accessed by organizations with a need to know 
that information.  This problem most recently received a great deal of scrutiny by the 
public and Congress after the al Qaeda terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001; however, 
information-sharing across electronic networks between federal, state, and local law 
enforcement (LE) agencies has been a notable problem for quite some time (Cohen, 
1994; Souder, 2001; Mueller, June 2002).  In a report on information-sharing capabilities 
within the public safety community, the Public Safety Wireless Advisory Council, 
established by Congress in 1995, stated that “unless immediate measures are taken to 
alleviate shortfalls and promote interoperability, public safety agencies will not be able to 
adequately discharge their obligation to protect life and property in a safe, efficient, and 
cost-effective manner” (NLECTC, 2002).   
2 
 Several information systems currently provide essential criminal justice 
information across the three tiers of government (federal, state, and local).  Figure 1 
depicts how state and local LEs access and receive information from federal criminal 
justice information systems.  These criminal justice information systems can be 
characterized in a variety of ways.  Some examples include fingerprint, ballistic, and 
 
criminal record databases.  Traditionally, most of the high-cost systems have been fielded 
at the federal level with the expectation that state and local LEs will/can access them in 
order to tap information/data that could be helpful in execution of their daily duties.  In 
most cases, this “information-sharing” relationship has simply not materialized 
(Canterbury, 2001; Johnson, 2002).  Previous research indicates information quality, 
trust, and access as possible reasons for this lack of information sharing (Kling, 2000).  
Although some actions such as the Public Safety Wireless Networks program and the 
FBI’s $400M Trilogy project are attempting to address the technology issues impeding 
collaborative information-sharing and networking capabilities within the LE community, 
Congressional testimony suggests there is more to the problem (Jordan, 2002; Mueller, 
2002; Ziglar, 2001; Souder, 2001).  As a precursor to developing new information 
systems to improve information sharing and collaboration between all levels of LEs, an 
Federal 
Information Systems 
State 
LE Organizat ions 
Local 
LE Organizations 
Figure 1:  Federal LE agencies communicate 
with state and local LE organizations through 
federal criminal justice information systems . 
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assessment of existing information systems and perceptions regarding their use and 
usefulness is necessary.   
Problem Statement 
 Though several information-sharing systems currently provide essential criminal 
justice information across the three tiers of government (federal, state, and local), the 
frequency of use and perceived usefulness of these existing information systems toward 
enhancing LE missions has never been assessed.  Additionally, perceptions about 
additional environmental factors that influence use of these systems (and ultimately 
information-sharing) have not been captured.   
Research Questions  
 In order to address the problem stated above, this thesis will concentrate on the 
following research questions.   
Research question #1.  To what extent are existing federal criminal justice 
information systems used by state and local departments?   
Research question #2.  What are state and local LE “user” perceptions regarding 
the usefulness of federal criminal justice information systems in accomplishing LE 
missions at the state and local levels? 
Research question #3.  What are state and local LE “user” perceptions regarding 
the environmental factors that may affect criminal justice information system usage and 
information sharing between federal and state/local LE levels?  Environmental factors 
include access, system quality, information quality, and trust. 
 
 
4 
Summary 
 The following chapters present the spectrum of information gathered and 
analyzed during this research effort.  The purpose of each chapter is outlined below: 
 Chapter 2, Literature Review, provides in-depth background material on LE 
organizations, current interoperability/information sharing problems, existing federal 
information systems, and current efforts to enhance information-sharing 
capabilities/processes.    
 Chapter 3, Methodology, discusses the design, testing, and implementation of the 
survey used to discover the extent of use and perceived usefulness of existing federal 
criminal justice information systems, as well as state/local LE users’ perceptions of 
additional environmental factors that influence the use of these information systems. 
 Chapter 4, Findings and Analysis, presents the survey results and analyzes the 
implications of those results toward the research questions proposed above.   
 Chapter 5, Conclusions, interprets research find ings in a practical perspective and 
presents recommendations based on what was discovered during research.  The 
limitations of this research effort and topics for future research are also presented.   
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II. Literature Review 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter reviews background information pertinent to how federal law 
enforcement agencies share information with state and local law enforcement agencies.  
The discussion of literature begins by defining the boundaries between federal law 
enforcement and state/local law enforcement levels.  The discussion then transitions into 
law enforcement information-sharing and interoperability.  Then follows a brief review of 
federal law enforcement coordination efforts as they relate to electronic information-
sharing capabilities.  Finally, the chapter ends with a discussion of the IS environmental 
factors that have been cited as influenc ing use and perceptions of the usefulness of 
federal criminal justice information systems.   
Definitions  
 Before discussing the literature, it is important to define a variety of terms in the 
context of this research.  Terms defined in this section include law enforcement officer, 
information system, information sharing, and interoperability.   
 Law Enforcement Officer. 
The first definition describes what is meant by the term “law enforcement 
officer.”  The basic definition of a law enforcement officer comes from Title 5 of the 
United States Code (Legal Information Institute, 2002):  “an employee, the duties of 
whose position are primarily the investigation, apprehension, or detention of individuals 
suspected or convicted of offenses against the criminal laws of the United States, or the 
protection of officials of the United States against threats to personal safety; and are 
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sufficiently rigorous that employment opportunities should be limited to young and 
physically vigorous individuals….”  In its rulings, the Merit Systems Protection Board, 
an Executive Branch agency that reviews federal employment policy issues as authorized 
by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, has reinforced this definition, directing that “a 
federal employee meets the definition of law enforcement officer if he or she:  has 
frequent direct contact with criminal suspects; is authorized to carry a firearm; 
interrogates witnesses and suspects, giving Miranda warnings when appropriate; works 
for long periods without a break; is on call 24 hours a day; is required to maintain a level 
of physical fitness” (Friel et al, 2002).   
 In addition to defining “law enforcement officer,” it is important to distinguish 
between the various levels of law enforcement in the government.  Federal law 
enforcement officers are employed by agencies operated or controlled by any one of the 
federal departments.  For example, the Department of Justice operates several law 
enforcement agencies (LEAs) including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), 
and the United States Marshal’s Service (USMS).  The Department of the Treasury also 
operates a number of LEAs including the Secret Service, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
and Firearms (ATF), United States Customs Service, and the Internal Revenue Service 
Criminal Investigative Division.  The Departments of State, Defense, Transportation, and 
the Interior also operate LEAs.  In all, there are 32 federal LEAs.  For descriptions of 
major federal LEAs, see Appendix A.  An LE officer at the federal level has the broadest 
level of authority covering wide jurisdictions, sometimes nationwide. 
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 Each state within the U.S. also operates a number of LEAs.  State LEAs usually 
operate solely within the borders of the particular state and include highway patrol, state 
troopers, and state bureaus of investigation (e.g., Florida Highway Patrol or the Kansas 
Bureau of Investigation).  State-run agencies may be nominally similar or share common 
tasks with federal agencies; however, state and federal LEAs are quite separate.  For 
example, officers employed at the state level do not carry commensurate authority or 
jurisdiction as federal LE officers. 
 Likewise, each county, province, municipality, city, and town within a state may 
operate a number of LEAs.  These agencies including county sheriff’s offices and city 
police departments represent the local LE level.  Local LEAs are limited in authority and 
jurisdiction even more so than state LEAs.  Local jurisdictions might include only the 
area within certain county lines or within city corporate limits.   
 Information System. 
Another important definition is that of an “information system.”  An information 
system can be defined as “a system, whether automated or manual, that comprises people, 
machines, and/or methods organized to collect, process, transmit, and disseminate data 
that represent user information” (Newton et al, 2002).  Information systems can include 
the Internet, private or public computer networks, radio networks, etc.  This thesis 
concentrates primarily on computer-based information systems which contain criminal 
justice information such as criminal histories, mugshots, fingerprints, etc.  In the LE 
community, these systems are commonly called criminal justice information systems.   
Information systems can also be conceptualized as socio-technical systems:  
complex, interdependent systems comprised of people, hardware, software, techniques, 
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support services, and information structures (such as content, rules/norms/regulations, 
access controls, etc) within a matrix of social and technical dependencies (Kling, 1999).  
In addition to the basic definition of an information system, the socio-technical view 
recognizes that cultural and environmental factors influence the use and perceptions of 
usefulness of a particular system.  Because this research addresses cultural factors 
influencing the use and perceptions of usefulness of criminal justice information systems, 
the socio-technical view of information systems has been adopted.  Accordingly, this 
thesis integrates Kling’s socio-technical view of information systems, which is discussed 
in more depth later in the chapter.   
Information sharing and interoperability have recently become extremely 
important topics in law enforcement (Jordan, 2002; Canterbury, 2002; Quijas, 2002).  
Network interoperability provides the basis for information sharing across information 
systems, which in turn affects the ability of distinctly separate units to work jointly 
toward completing tasks.  As public safety threats become more complex, especially with 
the increased threat of terrorism (i.e., the Murrah Federal Building bombing and 9/11 
terrorist attacks), the need for LE agencies to work jointly increases.  Congressional 
testimony indicates that greater information sharing and network interoperability 
capabilities within the LE community are necessary to achieve effective joint operations 
(Jordan, 2002; Mueller, June 2002; Souder, 2001).  The following paragraphs will briefly 
define what these terms mean in the context of this thesis effort. 
Information Sharing. 
 Information sharing is a basic concept.  It is the sharing of information and 
information resources among two or more parties.  Despite its conceptual simplicity, 
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information sharing can be difficult to achieve.  In government functions, there are 
several laws that apply to what information can be shared, how it can be shared, and with 
whom it can be shared (Whiting et al, 2001).  Security concerns further complicate 
information-sharing initiatives.  In testimony before the Senate’s Judiciary Committee, 
FBI Information Sharing Task Force Director Robert Jordan iterated this concern:  “One 
equity we must balance with our desire to share information as freely as possible is the 
need for the security of [highly classified and controlled] information” (Jordan, 2002).  
To address security concerns, the FBI has set up 47 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) 
which help to streamline interaction and information sharing between federal, state, and 
local law enforcement organizations.  Jordan stated that “JTTFs have proven to be one of 
the most effective methods of unifying federal, state, and local law enforcement efforts to 
prevent and investigate terrorist activity by ensuring that all levels of law enforcement are 
fully benefiting from the information possessed by each” (Jordan, 2002). 
As stated in Chapter 1, several recent incidents have underscored the importance 
of sharing criminal justice information and have revealed numerous faults in information-
sharing practices.  Recent information-sharing policy changes have evolved in light of 
tragedies such as the Columbine High School shooting, Murrah Federal Building 
bombing, and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  As Jordan (2002) stated before 
Congress, “a substantial component of this [counterterrorism] approach is information 
sharing, not only at the federal level but also within the entire law enforcement and 
intelligence communities.”  
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Interoperability. 
 Interoperability incorporates two distinct, yet related, ideas:  the ability of 
communication networks to pass information across system boundaries and the ability of 
separate organizations or separate sections within an organization to cooperate toward 
completing an action or goal.  These concepts are interrelated because separate units that 
can’t communicate with one another experience difficulty in efficiently completing joint 
tasks, as illustrated in the reactions of public safety agencies to the Columbine High 
School shooting incident (Columbine Review Commission, 2001).   
 Current communications interoperability problems arose from the way networks 
were originally designed.  The data systems and radio networks used by law enforcement 
today were implemented largely in a “simpler, less connected age” (CIO Magazine, 
2001).  Inspector General Glenn Fine, in his testimony before the Senate Subcommittee 
on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information, described the basic problem:  
“We see separate automated systems planned for almost every function in the INS, but 
many of these systems do not talk to each other and therefore cannot be used to meet 
other important agency goals” (Fine, 2001).  FBI Director Mueller noted the same 
problem among FBI IT systems (Puzzanghera, 2002).  Each system was designed to 
accomplish a narrowly defined purpose for a very specific group of individuals using 
different, often incompatible, operating systems.  Because network technology was so 
new when these systems were implemented, little thought was given to how these 
systems would communicate with each other as the systems matured.  Now that 
interoperability has become a prevalent issue, the full impact of each system’s 
incompatibility with other related systems is being realized.  It is a difficult and 
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expensive problem to solve.  For example, the INS operates a fingerprint identification 
system called IDENT, and the FBI utilizes their own fingerprint identification system 
called IAFIS.  Though the two systems perform a similar function, they were 
implemented using very different network architectures and operating systems.  A current 
project to improve criminal identification capabilities will connect the two systems.  That 
project is expected to take five years and $200M to complete (Whiting et al, 2001).  
Aldona Valicenti, CIO for the Commonwealth of Kentucky, noted that an integrated 
system can’t simply be purchased; federal and state agencies are faced with constructing 
interoperable networks comprised of new technology and divergent legacy systems 
already in use (CIO Magazine, 2001).   
 Resolving interoperability issues is a universal challenge, not confined to certain 
departments or governmental functions.  Given the magnitude of the problem, several 
interoperability research and grant programs have been implemented by the federal 
government to aid federal agencies in integrating their IT systems.  Some of these 
programs, like the Advanced Generation of Interoperability for Law Enforcement 
(AGILE) and Public Services Wireless Networks (PSWN), both described in Appendix 
B, are specifically concerned with enhancing interoperability within law enforcement 
agencies.  Many federal agencies, including the FBI, recognize that interoperability 
success includes a change in the way they do business.  As FBI Director Mueller (June 
2002) outlined the FBI’s reorganization plan to the Senate in early 2002, he delineated 
plans involving knowledge management principles, a collaborative information-sharing 
environment, and a strategic view of information sharing which would be cornerstones to 
the reorganization’s success. 
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Actions are also being taken to encourage interoperability between organizations 
in daily operations.  For example, a more unified link between intelligence-gathering 
agencies and law enforcement agencies has been encouraged by Congress, with little 
outward resistance from such primary representatives of those two groups as the CIA and 
FBI (Mueller, June 2002).  Duplication of effort has come under heavy fire as well.  As 
law enforcement agencies feel the crunch of diminishing resources, officials are 
reviewing overlapping functions such as border patrol, drug interdiction, and violent 
crime investigation for ways to improve efficiency (Mueller, June 2002).   
Such efforts are not without their problems.  One of the goals of the AGILE 
program is to increase interoperability “without requiring substantial changes to internal 
systems or procedures” (AGILE, 2002).  This will be a difficult goal to realize as many 
legacy systems will require a great deal of change in order to make them compatible with 
other systems, such as in the IDENT/IAFIS merger mentioned above.  Cost is another 
issue.  Modifying IT systems can be expensive, and there are a great number of systems 
requiring upgrades and modifications.   
Despite these challenges, interoperability successes have been realized within the 
LE sector.  For example, more than 500 police departments nationwide now utilize a 
wireless system linking patrol cars to an electronic database for at-the-scene information 
including license plate numbers, driver’s license information, and criminal histories.  The 
system returns requested information in as little as five seconds, and officers belonging to 
organizations using this network are able to reference up to 80 license plate checks per 
shift—up from 10 checks per shift using traditional methods (Motorola, 2002).   
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Law Enforcement Coordination Efforts 
 Despite the number of information-sharing systems available to LEAs, problems 
persist with getting critical information to the agency or individual who needs it (Council 
on Foreign Relations, 2002; Leahy, 1998; CIO Magazine, 2001).  Federal agencies have 
realized that cultural factors, such as negative attitudes toward sharing information, have 
greatly influenced abilities to complete LE missions.  Traditionally, federal agents were 
afforded the luxury of secrecy, often denying case details to state and local LE officials 
when working inside their jurisdictions.  However, the proliferation of terrorist activities 
within the U.S. has produced a threat to public safety so great that the luxury of secrecy 
can no longer be afforded to federal agents.  Consequently, in the weeks following the 
9/11 tragedies, many federal LEAs created offices dealing specifically with LE 
coordination issues across the three tiers of government.  This section will briefly cover 
FBI and INS realignment strategies intended to bolster LE coordination efforts as related 
to information sharing.   
 FBI Initiatives to Increase Information Sharing. 
Both the FBI and INS have executed plans to coordinate with state and local 
LEAs with greater openness, frequency, and diligence after both agencies fell under 
scrutiny by Congress in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  The FBI began a major 
restructuring operation in early 2002, realigning several strategic objectives from the 
previous strategic plan in 1998.  In his testimony to Congress in June 2002, FBI Director 
Robert Mueller outlined how the FBI was refocusing its mission and priorities.  One of 
the three primary missions under the agency’s new alignment is to provide support to 
federal, state, local, and international LE partners.  Mueller also stressed that, while law 
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enforcement, investigations, and protecting US interests remained the focus of FBI 
efforts, LE coordination is “equally critical to enabling the FBI to successfully achieve its 
goals and objectives” (Mueller, June 2002).  LE coordination efforts outlined in the FBI’s 
new strategic plan include the creation of the Office of Law Enforcement Coordination 
(OLEC), Chief Technology Officer (CTO), and Office of Records Management (ORM).   
The Office of Law Enforcement Coordination (OLEC) is the FBI’s primary 
authority “responsible for improving FBI coordination and information sharing with state 
and local law enforcement and public safety agencies” (Federal Bureau of Investigations, 
2002).  OLEC will act as the formal point-of-contact in the FBI for LE professional 
organizations as well as state and local LE agencies.  Formerly, no functional authority 
existed within the FBI to facilitate interaction with state and local LE officers.  FBI 
leadership realized that ad hoc relationships with other LEAs would not suffice against 
emerging threats against the U.S. and the that the bureau needed to create a cohesive 
relationship that combined LE capabilities of federal agencies and 675,000 state and local 
LE personnel into a synergistic effort (Mueller, May 2002). 
The FBI also expects to develop collaborative efforts in information sharing.  To 
encourage this objective, the FBI created two new offices:  the Chief Technology Officer 
(CTO), whose responsibility includes overseeing and modernizing IT programs including 
the Trilogy project, and the Office of Records Management who is “responsible for 
modernizing FBI records and knowledge management processes and policies” (Federal 
Bureau of Investigations, 2002).  The CTO’s responsibilities stem partly from the FBI’s 
Chief Information Officer (CIO) mission, and the two offices are interrelated entities.  
The CIO’s role involves IT strategy development supporting all the FBI’s departments 
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(Mueller, July 2002), and the CTO will help to meet those strategic objectives through IT 
initiatives including information-sharing tools such as Law Enforcement On-line, an 
interactive web-based LE education application.  The role of the Office of Records 
Management stems from an FBI goal to enhance the agency’s flexibility and agility.  Its 
mission is to combine the bits and pieces of information residing in FBI field offices into 
a centralized body of knowledge including subject matter experts and historical case 
knowledge (Mueller, June 2002) and, in the support of the FBI’s shift toward 
counterterrorism, it is charged with “building a national level of expertise and body of 
knowledge that can be accessed by and deployed to all field offices and that can be 
readily shared with our Intelligence Community and law enforcement partners”  
(Mueller, June 2002).  Additionally, Mueller expects the Office of Records Management 
to eradicate file management and documentation deficiencies noted in the House Judicial 
Committee’s investigation report.  Like the CTO/CIO relationship, the Office of Records 
Management will interact closely with the pre-existing Information Resources Division, 
which holds the responsibility of managing/planning the FBI’s information resources and 
developing architectures for information collection and use.   
INS Initiatives to Increase Information Sharing. 
The INS also began restructuring after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  In his testimony 
before the House Judiciary Committee, INS Director James Ziglar cited serious resource 
shortfalls (including personnel) as a factor relating to the agency’s inability to effectively 
meet today’s immigration law enforcement challenges (Ziglar, 2001).  The root causes of 
resource shortfalls include a “significant growth in illegal immigration activity, 
unprecedented increases in application for immigration services, and new immigration 
 
16 
laws that heightened the complexity of the agency’s responsibilities” (Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, 2001). 
The INS Restructuring Proposal outlined three important realignment features 
designed to improve the agency’s interoperability with other federal, state, and local 
LEAs:  splitting immigration services and immigration enforcement into two separate 
bureaus, creation of a CIO position, and the creation of the Interagency Liaison Officer 
position (Immigration and Naturalization Service, 2001).   
The INS Restructuring Proposal calls for a separation of its two basic missions—
immigrations services and law enforcement—into completely distinct chains of command 
operating within the same agency.  According to the proposal, the Bureau of Immigration 
Services will handle all activities related to provisions outlined in guidelines of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Act including immigration benefits, naturalization 
application processes, and asylum/refugee determinations.  The Bureau of Immigration 
Enforcement will take on all law enforcement responsibilities currently relegated to INS 
including border patrol, detention and removal, and international enforcement 
(Immigration and Naturalization Service, 2001).  The proposal asserts that this change 
will improve INS mission effectiveness by “better defining roles and responsibilities, 
simplifying the chain of command, and strengthening accountability” (Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, 2001).  The intention here is to simplify processes to improve 
performance and remedy major problems identified through procedural audits.  Easy-to-
understand organizational structure and roles are expected to facilitate communication 
with state and local LEAs, in effect, streamlining immigration LE processes. 
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The newly created CIO will manage implementation, access control, maintenance, 
and provision of all INS information systems.  The CIO will also coordinate information-
sharing activities with other federal, state, and local agencies.  Finally, the Interagency 
Liaison Officer (ILO) holds the overall responsibility of fostering law enforcement 
coordination across the three tiers of government.  The ILO will “facilitate an improved 
flow of information and cooperation with federal, state and local law enforcement 
organizations” (Immigration and Naturalization Service, 2001).  This office is analogous 
to the FBI’s Office of Law Enforcement Coordination. 
From a LE coordination perspective, the restructuring plan seeks to improve INS 
mission accomplishment through clearer accountability standards, enhanced information-
sharing capabilities, better defined strategic intergovernmental relationships, and 
elimination of competing priorities.  If these objectives are met, INS expects to obtain a 
more synergistic relationship with state and local LEAs. 
Summary of Federal LEA Initiatives to Increase Information Sharing. 
Federal LEAs have begun to realize the value of open communications and robust 
interagency coordination efforts across jurisdictional and level-of-government 
boundaries.  As resources get tighter on all levels, the need for synergistic operations 
between local, state, and federal LEAs will become critical.  There are only 56 FBI field 
offices across the U.S.; however, these field offices are able to increase their reach, 
flexibility, and resource pools through collaborative efforts with the 19,000 state and 
local LE offices nationwide.  Information-sharing tools like NLETS and IAFIS provide a 
foundation for distributing criminal justice information; however, effective and well-
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planned coordination efforts are necessary in combination with information-sharing 
capabilities to make collaborative law enforcement a successful national program.     
Environmental Factors  that Influence Information Sharing via Information Systems  
 The following sections discuss the IS environmental factors discovered in the 
literature that influence information sharing via information systems.  Social informatics 
is the “interdisciplinary study of the design, uses, and consequences of information 
technologies that takes into account their interaction with institutional and cultural 
contexts” (Kling, 1999).  Social informatics looks at information systems in the 
workplace as more than just tools because an information system’s use is “unavoidably 
linked with social and organizational factors” (Kling, 2001).  Instead, information 
systems are viewed primarily as socio-technical systems:  complex, interdependent 
systems comprised of people, hardware, software, techniques, support services, and 
information structures (such as content, rules/norms/regulations, access controls, etc.) 
within a matrix of social and technical dependencies (Kling, 1999).  Social informatics 
recognizes that achieving a more complete understanding of information and 
communication technologies requires that business models be supplemented with an 
ecological viewpoint (Kling, 2000) where IS environmental factors such as institutional 
and cultural contexts (Kling, 1999) influence the usage and perceptions of usefulness of 
information systems and must be taken into consideration over the system’s lifetime.  
While there are many IS environmental factors that influence the usage and perceptions 
of usefulness of information systems in general, this literature review identified four IS 
environmental factors specifically influential to the usage and perceptions of usefulness 
of federal criminal justice information systems:  access, system quality, information 
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quality, and trust.  The following paragraphs describe each of the factors and their 
meaning in the context of this research. 
 Access.   
Kling (2000) talks about three aspects of access: technological access, social 
access, and access control.  In Kling’s terms, “technological access refers to the physical 
availability of suitable equipment, including computers that are of adequate speed and 
equipped with appropriate software for a given activity” (2000).  Social access refers to 
the “mix of professional knowledge, economic resources, and technical skills for using 
technologies…” (Kling, 2000).  Access control refers to applying constraints on certain 
users limiting the availability of certain resources (Newton et al, 2002).  Though one of 
Kling’s three aspects of access, social access was not identified as a potential problem for 
federal criminal justice information systems in the literature, technological access and 
access control were often cited as issues affecting frequency of use and perceptions of 
usefulness of criminal justice information systems (Canterbury, 2001; Jordan, 2002; 
Mueller, April 2002; Souder, 2001).  In his testimony regarding federal information 
sharing with local law enforcement to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Fraternal Order of 
Police National Vice President Chuck Canterbury underscored the importance of access:  
It is critical that state and local agencies be kept in the loop by their 
federal counterparts.  Ninety-six percent of law enforcement 
officers in the United States are employed by state and local 
governments….Yet, in critical situations, federal agencies citing 
federal statutes restrict access to this important information.  All 
too often, interagency cooperation is hampered by the lack of a 
free flow of information from federal agencies to state and local 
departments.  In the past, it has often been a one-way street, with 
state and local law enforcement providing information to their 
federal colleagues and getting very little if any information in 
return (Canterbury, 2001). 
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 Chuck Wexler, executive director of the law enforcement think tank Police 
Executive Research Forum, describes state and local LE frustrations with federal criminal 
justice information systems:  “…police officials are infuriated about having to undergo 
background checks of up to six months to gain access to FBI reports….We should be 
sharing information right away” (Johnson, 2002).  These frustrations seem contradictory 
to FBI Director Mueller’s promise:  “Let me assure you of one thing: if a state and 
municipal law enforcement agency does not possess a needed expertise, the FBI will 
provide the assistance and expertise needed” (Mueller, June 2002).  In an earlier 
statement, Mueller (May 2002) stated that collaboration with state and local LE 
organizations was an FBI priority intended to strengthen professional relationships and 
information sharing.   
  Technological Access. 
 As previously stated, technological access is one of the two access-related issues 
related to criminal justice information systems.  It is a growing concern within major 
federal criminal justice information system programs, notably in the AGILE, IAFIS, and 
NIBIN programs (AGILE, 2002; CJIS Division, 2002; NIBIN Branch, 2002).  
Acquisition, installation, and maintenance costs for the equipment necessary to access 
these systems are prohibitively expensive for most police departments (CJIS Division, 
2002; NIBIN Branch, 2002).  This limitation almost automatically excludes many state 
and local LE departments from access to the information contained within those criminal 
justice information systems.  To remedy the problem, the Department of Justice has 
enacted a program to provide funding to state and local LE organizations for the 
acquisition and installation of certain systems (NIBIN Branch, 2002).  The Department of 
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Justice realizes that the information contained on specific federal criminal justice 
information systems such as NIBIN is critical to aiding state and local LE departments in 
effectively completing public safety missions.  Specifically, this information aids 
investigators in the identification, apprehension, and conviction of criminal suspects.  
Without access to this information, the ability of state and local LE organizations to carry 
out public safety missions can be seriously impaired or degraded.  In testimony to the 
House Appropriations Committee, FBI Director Mueller (June 2002) stated that “…each 
[Special Agent in Charge] should also take into account the ability of state, municipal, 
and other federal law enforcement to handle the full range of criminal violations….”  
This statement demonstrates an emerging attitude within the federal LE agencies to 
realistically consider the capabilities of state and local LE organizations and to assess 
how the actions of federal agencies can impact the capabilities of state/local LE 
organizations.  More specifically, federal LE agencies are beginning to consider 
enhancing capabilities of state and local LE organizations through increased information 
sharing in order to positively impact the LE community as a whole.   
 Access Control. 
Access control is the second access-related issue concerning federal criminal 
justice information systems.  Access controls limit users’ access to types of information 
or features contained on an information system.  For example, a certain user may have an 
NLETS account which allows him access to the IAFIS database; however, due to access 
controls placed on his account, this user may not have access to other NLETS databases 
such as CODIS or III.  Certain access controls were identified in the literature as possible 
problem areas.  As in the example, the literature indicated that state/local LE units were 
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excluded from certain areas on federal criminal justice information systems (Whiting et 
al, 2001; Dempsey, 2000).   
Additionally, denial of access to case-related and classified information was 
identified as a problem (Jordan, 2002; Mueller, June 2002).  Case-related information can 
exist in many forms:  criminal histories, fingerprints, DNA samples, psychological 
profiles, etc.  Different pieces of information about the same person or case can exist at 
different locations or in different departments.  While it may seem easy to simply share 
this information, there are obstacles that impede sharing case-related information.  Legal 
constraints are an example of obstacles limiting access to information.  Several laws 
prohibit the sharing of several types of information among LE organizations in order to 
protect the rights and privacy of citizens.  The biggest obstacle, however, is finding this 
information.  Take the D.C. sniper case for example.  John Lee Malvo, the 17-year-old 
suspect in the sniper case, was arrested in Montgomery, AL for a shooting committed on 
the night of 21 September, 2002—only weeks before the D.C. shootings began.  Malvo’s 
fingerprints were obtained during the criminal investigation and stored on a criminal 
database run by the State of Alabama.  Weeks later, during the sniper investigation, 
federal agents obtained shell casings from several crime scenes which contained 
fingerprints—possibly belonging to the shooter.  The fingerprints did not match any 
sample in the FBI’s database.  As the investigation progressed, federal agents received 
information that linked the D.C. sniper to the Alabama case.  With this lead, federal 
agents contacted Alabama state LE officers to investigate the match.  Within two hours, a 
match was confirmed and federal agents now had an identified suspect in the sniper case.  
Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, access controls to criminal justice information have been 
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reviewed.  The USA Patriot Act, passed in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, relaxed 
and even repealed several laws impeding information sharing; however, as evidenced by 
the statements of Canterbury and Wexler above, more progress may be necessary to 
realize effective sharing of case-related information.   
A greater problem may exist with classified information due to its sensitivity.  
Classified information possessed by federal LE agencies is shared in few circumstances.  
The D.C. sniper shooting case was unprecedented in the amount of classified information 
that passed between federal agents and state/local LE officers.  As a rule, classified 
information possessed by federal LE agencies is only shared when the situation is so dire 
as to necessitate it.  However, given the evolving nature of major criminal activity in the 
U.S., as previously discussed, this attitude may be changing. 
System Quality.   
System quality is another IS environmental factor that influences information 
system usage and perceptions of usefulness.  U.S. Inspector General Glenn A. Fine 
testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee about system quality problems within the 
Justice Department:  “We see separate automated systems planned for almost every 
function in the INS, but many of these systems do not ‘talk’ to each other and therefore 
cannot be used to meet other important agency missions” (Fine, 2001).  System quality 
encompasses a wide range of information system characteristics ranging from how long it 
takes to connect to the network to how capable the system is at recovering from an attack.  
Four system quality characteristics were identified in the literature as possible problems:  
flexibility, currency, security, and interpersonal vs. electronic contact. 
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 Flexibility.   
Flexibility refers to the capability of an information system to support various 
platforms—often termed robustness in the IS community (Newton et al, 2002).  Concern 
about whether a new system would be able to integrate with the various existing 
state/local networks was expressed during the development of the FBI’s Interstate 
Identification Index (SAIC, 2002) (see Appendix B for program description).  Developers 
of the III system realized that it had to be flexible enough to accommodate the various 
network implementations that might exist among III’s future users.  While the III system 
took this feature into consideration during the design phase, many other federal criminal 
justice information systems which were developed before the proliferation of networks in 
the workplace require upgrades or other reengineering before they are compatible with 
the various existing network implementations.  The seriousness of this problem for the 
LE community has not yet been determined. 
 Currency. 
Currency refers to how state-of-the-art federal criminal justice information system 
technology is.  The currency of technology in the federal sector seems to be a major 
concern, and much of the literature referred to how obsolete criminal justice information 
technology is perceived to be within the federal sector.  Existing federal criminal justice 
information systems are often described as obsolete or behind current capabilities (CIO 
Magazine, 2001; Dean, 2001; Dizard, 2002; Higgins K., 2002; Mueller, May 2002; 
Puzzanghera, 2002).  Given the frequency with which federal criminal justice systems are 
described as obsolete, it would appear that this system quality feature may be a problem.  
Given that some criminal justice information systems still work in a green-screen 
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environment (Higgins K., 2002; Mueller, May 2002), there’s little doubt that federal 
criminal justice information system technology is behind current capabilities.  Many state 
and local IS networks are in just as bad shape.  The funding to upgrade these systems 
simply has not been allocated; however, because federal systems have not been 
modernized, state and local systems on the same level can still access the information 
resident on these systems regardless of the obsolete nature of the technology.   
 Security. 
The security of information on federal criminal information systems is another 
greatly discussed topic in the literature.  In reaction to the growing number of cyber 
attacks in the late 1990s, the Critical Infrastructure Protection Board was formed to 
monitor emerging cyber threats and to warn government, business, and educational 
communities of cyber threats such as the “Melissa” virus.  The intent of this organization 
is to limit the damage inflicted by major attacks on U.S. IT infrastructure, including 
criminal justice information networks.  If criminal justice information networks are 
damaged or otherwise off- line for extended periods of time, the ability of the LE 
community to carry out public safety missions is negatively influenced.  Likewise, the 
information contained on criminal justice information networks must be adequately 
protected from malicious manipulation, where data is illicitly deleted or changed by 
unauthorized system users. 
In addition to protecting criminal justice information from hackers or loss (Vaida, 
2001), the sensitivity of this information requires that sharing be restricted to a “need to 
know” basis.  Jordan (2002) states “the need for information security must be balanced 
by the driving need of the criminal investigator to be able to follow any and all avenues 
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in an investigation.  Creating a methodology for properly identifying individuals with a 
need to know and grant ing them access further complicates security measures.  If these 
security measures are not addressed appropriately, perceived system quality may be 
negatively affected.   
 Interpersonal vs. electronic contact. 
A preference for interpersonal contact is another cultural characteristic identified 
in the literature that may have significant influence on the usage and perceived usefulness 
of federal criminal information systems.  “To get the data they need, many enforcers still 
favor using faxes or milking personal relationships” over information systems (CIO 
Magazine, 2001).  Computer and network technologies are still so new that many 
officials in the LE community may still be significantly uncomfortable with utilizing 
information systems in the workplace.  This cultural characteristic may take years to 
disappear as older LE officers are replaced by recruits who are more comfortable with 
utilizing IS technology in the workplace.  Though this IS environmental factor is 
mentioned in the literature, the overall significance of this factor toward influencing the 
use of criminal justice information systems has not been fully analyzed.   
Information Quality.   
Information quality is another IS environmental factor that influences usage and 
perceptions of usefulness.  Poor information quality can negatively affect perceptions of 
the usefulness of a particular system.  Kling’s (2001) example from the Department of 
Motor Vehicles (DMV) provides an illustration of how poor information quality can 
deteriorate the usefulness, which ultimately affects the usage, of information systems.  In 
this example, the DMV linked the DMV database with the Social Security 
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Administration (SSA) database in an effort to make the license issuing process more 
efficient.  The plan was to enter the social security number the license applicant and use 
the name, date of birth, and other information contained on the SSA database.  However, 
the SSA database did not record nicknames (i.e., “Pete” instead of “Peter” or “Matt” 
instead of “Matthew”) or name changes (i.e., for marriage or other legal name changes).  
These discrepancies halted the process completely, and individuals were refused a license 
due to these minor differences.  Consequently, the new system was deemed inappropriate 
for accomplishing DMV objectives and was abhorred by users and customers alike.   
Information quality can also be affected by the accuracy of information contained 
on the system (Dempsey, 2000).  An example of how accuracy affects the quality of 
criminal justice information systems can be seen in statements found in Congressional 
testimony.  U.S. Inspector General Fine testified that, during an inspection of INS 
information systems, the information on INS information systems was found to be 
“incomplete and unreliable due to missing departure records and errors in processing of 
the records” (Fine, 2001).  Accuracy is a critical information quality factor in the LE 
community.  It can lead to wrongfully convicting an innocent suspect or mistakenly 
acquitting a guilty suspect.  Either situation can lead to tragic consequences and is 
deemed unacceptable by public safety standards.      
Additionally, information quality can be affected by how frequently resident 
information on the system is updated or new information is introduced (Dempsey, 2000).  
Congressional testimony reinforced questions about information quality on criminal 
justice information systems regarding the frequency of updates.  In the wake of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, INS Commissioner James Ziglar testified before the House Committee 
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on Government Reform that “our ability to do our job is really limited only by our 
resources and the time it takes to put resources online” (Souder, 2001).  This problem 
was highlighted in recounts of the Rafael Resendez-Ramirez case, where the failure to 
update information on the IDENT-INS system contributed to the release of a known felon 
illegal alien (Resendez-Ramirez) in June 1999.  Resendez-Ramirez was mistakenly 
released from a U.S. prison into the custody of the border patrol, who deported him to 
Mexico.  Resendez-Ramirez “returned to the United States within days of his release and 
murdered several more people before surrendering…” (Fine, 2001).   
 Finally, information quality can be affected by how long resident information on 
the system is kept in the database (Dempsey, 2000).  This is an important issue for 
maintaining any database.  One simple solution is to discard information when an 
offender has passed away; however, this may further complicate closing some cases.  For 
example, murder and other violent crime cases are open indefinitely.  The Jack the Ripper 
files are open cases despite the fact that the murderer is long dead.  Likewise, more 
modern violent crime cases remain unclosed because they have not been solved.  
Discarding criminal history, DNA, and fingerprint information of known felons who have 
died may destroy the possibility of solving open violent crime cases if one of those dead 
felons was involved.  The literature did not yield whether the LE community perceives 
information on federal criminal justice information systems is kept for an adequate period 
of time or whether that information is discarded too quickly.   
Consequently, when users perceive that information quality has dropped below a 
threshold of usefulness, they may turn to other information sources.  If federal criminal 
justice information systems fail to provide the quality of information needed by the user, 
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state and local LE officers may turn to other available options.  One such option is the 
local community.  The following example highlights the fact that locally-obtained 
information sometimes holds greater value for the user.  Months before the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks, FBI Agent Coleen Rowley discovered evidence that could have prevented the 
hijackings (Rowley, 2002; Council on Foreign Relations, 2002).  When she channeled 
this information to FBI Headquarters in Washington DC, her request to investigate was 
denied despite her beliefs that the information was vital to national security.   
Additionally, state and local LE officials also have the option of turning to state-
run criminal justice information systems.  Since its inception in 1999, the Kansas 
Criminal Justice Information System (see Appendix C for program description) has been 
regarded as a very successful criminal justice information system (Wartell, 2000) and has 
prompted other states to develop their own versions.  Additionally, most states provide a 
state-run electronic fingerprinting service similar to the FBI’s IAFIS.  As discussed 
above, during the D.C.-area sniper case, information from Alabama’s fingerprinting 
service helped to confirm the identities of the prime suspects in the case.   
In light of these options, federal agencies are concerned with whether state/local 
LE users utilize federal criminal justice information systems and the information 
contained within those systems.  One concern is the growing complexity of criminal 
threats against the U.S.  As criminal activity becomes more sophisticated, cooperation 
from LE professionals across geographically separated areas will be necessary to 
successfully combat these threats.  Clues may be widespread across the nation, as in the 
9/11 terrorist case.  Alone, local or regional information systems may not be effective 
because their grasp (across state/territorial borders) may not be sufficient to reach the 
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entire LE community.  Federal systems, though they have not officially taken on this role, 
may be able to provide that kind of oversight—connecting geographically separated LE 
organizations to the information they need.  Another reason is that federal criminal 
information systems are the sole source for certain pieces of information, such as 
ballistics information from NIBIN.  Without these systems, critical information simply 
may not reach the organization that needs it.    
Trust. 
Trust is the final IS environmental factor influencing federal criminal justice 
information systems usage and perceptions of usefulness.  In 1997, Iacono and Weisband 
conducted a study on virtual teams—“groups of people who must work closely together 
for a short period of time, learn from each other and accomplish specific goals, but for 
whom face-to-face contact is too costly or simply not possible most of the time” (Iacono 
et al, 1997).  The virtual team concept closely resembles the relationship studied in this 
research.  Iacono and Weisband’s research examined how trust was developed in 
temporary, electronic teams (Iacono et al, 1997).  Virtual teams develop a form of trust 
called “swift trust” (Iacono et al, 1997; Meyerson et al, 1996) where “members must act 
swiftly as if trust were in place rather than waiting to see who can be trusted and who 
cannot” (Iacono et al, 1997).  Swift trust evolves over time as temporary groups reinforce 
their initial trust or damage it (Meyerson et al, 1996).     
Iacono et al (1997) argue that virtual teams “must work continuously and 
consistently to maintain expectations of trust.”  One trust maintenance activity is how 
responsive federal LE agencies are to requests for information from state/local LE 
organizations.  This behavior is alluded to several times in the literature.  “[Federal, state, 
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and local LE agencies] should be sharing information right away,” asserts Police 
Executive Research Forum executive director Chuck Wexler (Johnson, 2002).  However, 
as stated earlier, inspections on federal criminal justice systems within the Justice 
Department found that this was not the case:  “…the FBI must be able to rapidly identify 
and disseminate pertinent intelligence information to the law enforcement community.  
Failure to capitalize on leads in its possession can delay or seriously impede an 
investigation” (Fine, 2001).     
State/local LE officials’ perceptions about federal agencies’ abilities to carry out 
duties or effectively complete missions can impact trust.  The literature suggests that 
certain recent federal LE actions may have damaged this trust; e.g., the Rowley incident 
discussed above (Council on Foreign Relations, 2002).  After testimony by several 
federal LE commissioners during a hearing with the House Committee on Government 
Reform concerning post-9/11 homeland security, U.S. Representative Ben Gilman stated, 
“…it’s important that we recognize the potential for law enforcement resources to be 
stretched beyond their means.  In fact, we’re hearing reports that resources for other law 
enforcement missions, such as our drug interdiction, may be diverted to fill the new 
demand for homeland security” (Souder, 2001).  FBI Director Mueller testified that the 
agency’s intelligence-gathering strategy was “fractured and not well coordinated” 
(Mueller, May 2002).  In testimony later that year, Mueller stated the FBI was attempting 
to “create a centralized body of subject matter experts and historical case knowledge that, 
in the past, has been largely resident in a few FBI field offices” (Mueller, June 2002).  In 
further testimony, Vice President of the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association 
Michael Prout expressed the challenges faced by INS officers:  “The INS deports 112,000 
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illegal immigrants a year, fewer than half the 275,000 who enter illegally each year or 
stay after their visas expire….As I travel to the numerous FLEOA chapters throughout 
the country, the topic most on the minds of the more than 1,000 beleaguered INS special 
agents who currently belong to FLEOA is the urgent need for a substantive and dynamic 
reorganization of the immigration law enforcement mission….The latest Census figures 
list 1,875,000 illegals in California or 4,630 per agent” (Prout, 2001).  Based on these 
statements, it may appear that federal agencies are overwhelmed or otherwise incapable 
of completing public safety missions.  If this impression has permeated the state and local 
tiers of the LE community, their trust in federal agencies may be negatively impacted. 
The quality of interaction between virtual group members can impact trust as 
well.  In the past, the quality of interaction between federal agencies and the rest of the 
LE community has been poor (Canterbury, 2001; Johnson, 2002).  In April, 2002, FBI 
Director Mueller announced the creation of the FBI’s Office of Law Enforcement 
Coordination (OLEC) as part of the FBI’s reorganization—the purpose of which is “to 
foster cooperation and strengthen law enforcement relationships at every level” (Mueller, 
April 2002).  Shortly after its creation, OLEC’s new director, Louis Quijas, stated, “One 
of the goals of the OLEC is to help bring together federal, state, and local resources to 
make our communities safer….[Mueller] has said many times that the FBI is only as 
good as its relationships with state and locals.  We are of the belief that quality 
communications will be the basis of those relationships” (Quijas, 2002).  Whether 
reorganization efforts help to improve the quality of interaction between federal LE 
agencies and the rest of the LE community is yet to be seen. 
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Iacono et al (1997) also argue that a necessary part of interaction between virtual 
teams is “the forming of good communications habits (e.g., checking and responding to 
email as demanded by the task)….”  As implied, these good communications habits 
include feedback.  Wexler’s statement about communication between state/local LE 
agencies and the federal government being a one-way street (Johnson, 2002) indicates 
that feedback from federal LE agencies has been lacking.  This is another problem that 
the FBI and INS hope their reorganizations will help to correct.   
Summary 
 To recap, this chapter began by defining several key concepts used throughout 
this thesis including law enforcement, information systems, information sharing, and 
interoperability.  The difference between the three tiers of government (federal, state, and 
local) as relates to LE was also discussed.  The discussion then transitioned to ongoing 
efforts within federal LE agencies (specifically, the FBI and INS) to better collaborate 
with state and local LE organizations.  Finally, the IS environmental factors introduced in 
Chapter 1 (access, system quality, information quality, and trust) were explained in 
further detail.   
The next chapter presents the research methodology used for this thesis effort to 
discover how effective federal law enforcement electronic information sharing 
coordination efforts are perceived among state and local law enforcement organizations.  
A survey-based data collection methodology was used in this research, and Chapter 3 will 
discuss information about survey implementation procedures, validation processes, and 
procedures for designing and testing the survey instrument. 
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III. Methodology 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter describes the research methodology used during the data collection 
phase of this research effort.  The following sections include information about survey 
implementation procedures, validation processes, and a description of the survey’s 
sample population.  Procedures for designing and testing the survey instrument are 
presented, including survey question construction, pretest and pilot test procedures, and 
results of the human subjects review.  The research questions are also explained in more 
detail.  Finally, data analysis strategies are discussed. 
Driver for Research Design 
The overall objective of this research was to collect state and local LE 
perceptions, or attitudinal information, about federal criminal justice information 
systems.  It was determined that system evaluations or document reviews would only 
yield superficial information about the characteristics of each system (e.g., how much 
data is contained on the system, how many users are authorized on the system, how fast 
the average transfer rate on the system is, etc).  Though this kind of information helps to 
describe a system, the methodology would not have been sufficient to achieve the 
research objectives.  In contrast, a survey-based research design allows for the collection 
and analysis of quantifiable information pertaining to the research questions.  Therefore, 
a survey was designed specifically to gain data on usage and perceptions of usefulness of 
federal criminal justice information systems in the context of the LE user at the state and 
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local levels.  This research design appeared to be the most useful methodology toward 
achieving the stated research objectives. 
Additionally, individual survey questions were constructed in a format suitable 
for collecting perceptual information by using a Likert scale.  “The Likert scale works 
particularly well in the context of a series of questions that seek to elicit attitudinal 
information about one specific subject matter” (Rea et al., 1997).   
In order to collect enough data for statistically valid results, responses were 
needed from a certain number of individuals from the target population.  Therefore, 
characteristics of the target population had to be factored into the considerations for 
research design.  The primary driver for using a survey, from the perspective of the target 
population, was convenience for the audience.  Dr. John Firman, International 
Association of Chiefs of Police Research Department, advised that response rates among 
law enforcement personnel tend to be low.  With respect to this, simplicity and ease of 
use became primary survey design objectives.  Survey completion time had to be 
minimized in order to encourage a higher response rate.  The total survey completion 
time goal was less than 15 minutes. 
Components of Research Design 
 This section includes information on various components of the research design.  
Here, each of the research questions introduced in Chapter 1 is explained in more depth.  
The survey development process is also discussed, including brief descriptions of each 
survey question.  The survey’s sample population is also described, stating the reasons 
for including each portion of the sample population.  Finally, research design quality 
considerations such as validity and reliability are presented. 
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Research Questions.  
Research question #1:  How frequently are existing federal criminal justice 
information systems used by state and local departments?   
This question concentrated on the frequency of use of certain federal criminal 
justice information systems that connect federal LE agencies with the state and local 
levels.  The goal of this research question was to answer, from the perspective of state 
and local LE organizations, the extent to which existing federal criminal justice 
information systems are used.  The range of information systems examined in this survey 
was constrained by several factors.  The first limitation was that information systems 
studied in this research had to be criminal justice information systems.   Second, only 
federal criminal jus tice information systems were addressed.  Several multi-state or 
regional criminal justice information systems exist—such as the Northern Lights project, 
a state-administered IS initiative which connects law enforcement organizations across 
the borders of Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, and New York (Leahy, 1998).  
However, this study was concerned with information sharing between the federal level 
and state/local levels.  Therefore, to answer this question, analysis was constrained to 
criminal justice information systems executed at the federal level which grant access to 
state/local LE users.  Research question #1 implied that federal criminal justice 
information systems allow state/local LE users access to the information.  Indeed, there 
are federal criminal justice information systems that do not grant access below the federal 
level—DRUGX, for example (Drug Enforcement Administration, 2002).  However, for 
the purposes of this study, those systems were excluded from the survey.  Only federal 
criminal justice information systems that allow state/local LE users access were 
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considered for inclusion on the survey.  Additionally, only existing criminal justice 
information systems were considered—barring phased-out or future-planned information 
systems.  Additionally, comparisons of subsets of the sample population, based on 
collected demographics, were conducted to determine if responses to survey items 
pertaining to this research question differed significantly.   
Research question #2:  What are state and local LE “user” perceptions regarding 
the usefulness of federal criminal justice information systems in accomplishing LE 
missions at the state and local levels?  This question concentrated on the extent of 
usefulness of certain federal criminal justice information systems that connect federal LE 
agencies with the state and local levels.  The goal of this research question was to answer, 
from the perspective of state and local LE users, how useful federal criminal justice 
information systems are perceived to be toward accomplishing LE missions.  The 
question assumed that certain federal criminal justice information systems may be 
perceived to be more useful than others.  As with the first research question, comparisons 
of subsets of the sample population, based on collected demographics, were conducted to 
determine if responses to survey items pertaining to this research question differed 
significantly.    
Research question #3:  What are state and local LE “user” perceptions regarding 
the environmental factors that affect criminal justice information system usage and 
subsequent information sharing between federal and state/local LE levels?  There are 
certain IS environmental factors that may influence user perceptions about the usefulness 
of a particular information system, thereby affecting usage of those criminal justice 
information systems and subsequent information sharing.  For example, the amount of 
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data accessible through a particular information system may affect how useful that 
system is perceived to be.  For instance, an information system that allows the user access 
to a great deal of data might be more useful than an information system that allows access 
to a limited amount of data.  Likewise, the quality of information on a system may also 
affect perceptions about usefulness.  For example, an information system with access to 
large amounts of irrelevant data may be perceived to be less useful than an information 
system with a smaller amount of pertinent data.  Overall, this research question attempted 
to assess state and local LE criminal justice information system user perceptions 
regarding the IS environmental factors that may influence information system usage and 
information sharing.  Environmental factors addressed in this study included access, 
system quality, information quality, and trust as discussed in Chapter 2.  As with the first 
two research questions, comparisons of subsets of the sample population, based on 
collected demographics, were conducted to determine if responses to survey items 
pertaining to this research question differed significantly.    
Survey Construction. 
  This section describes the survey formats and advantages of using each format. 
  Survey Format. 
 The survey was implemented in two formats:  web-based for LE professional 
organizations and mail-out for CIOs of state bureaus of investigation.  While choosing 
only the web-based format was considered optimal, constraints on the sample population 
forced the use of both the web-based and mail-out formats.  It has been reported that 
using a mixed method approach can influence research results; however, there are several 
factors that minimize the effects of this mixed approach.   Several studies have found that 
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response rates for web-based surveys tend to be lower than mail-out surveys (Manfreda et 
al, 2001; Gonier, 1999; Kwak et al, 1999).  Manfreda et al cite “low preference for the 
web mode” (2001) as a possible contributing factor.  For this study, only a small portion 
of the sample population received the mailed survey (50 out of 15,000).  Additionally, 
studies indicate that there may be statistically significant substantive and data quality 
differences (e.g. non-response rates for closed ended questions) between the two methods 
that may impact research results (Manfreda et al, 2001; Gonier, 1999). Simply noted, the 
researcher is aware of the influences of using a mixed method approach; however, 
deemed it necessary to complete research objectives.  Results from the web-based format 
and mail-out format were compared to detect statistically significant differences in the 
responses.  The results of this comparison are presented in the “Comparisons” section of 
Chapter 4.  
  Web-based Format. 
 The primary implementation of the survey, a web-based format, was chosen for 
several reasons.  First, “both quantitative and qualitative information can be gathered” 
(Upcraft et al, 2002).  This allows the survey to contain both closed- and open-ended 
questions.  Also, web-based surveys can be more convenient for the respondent (Upcraft 
et al, 2002)—allowing the respondent to take the survey at their own pace, in their chosen 
environment, and at their chosen time.  Web-based surveys allow the collection of results 
without recording identifying information which allows anonymity in responses (Upcraft 
et al, 2002).  In addition, the cost of implementing a web-based survey can be 
considerably less than other alternatives (Upcraft et al, 2002; Solomon, 2001).  
Consequently, it’s possible to reach a wider respondent pool given constrained resources, 
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even if the audience is dispersed across a wide geographic area (Upcraft et al, 2002; 
Solomon, 2001).  Finally, respondent time to complete a web-based survey can be less 
than other methods (Upcraft et al, 2002; Solomon, 2001).  This aspect was considered 
very important in maximizing the response rate from the LE community. 
  Mail-out Format. 
Several reasons influenced using the mail-out format as the secondary survey 
method.  First, a mail-out format enhances convenience to the user (Rea et al, 1997).  
According to Rea et al, this format alleviates time constraints, allowing respondents to 
think about their answers more clearly.  Like the web-based survey, another convenience 
factor is flexibility: respondents take the survey at their own pace, in their chosen 
environment, and at their chosen time.  A mail-out format also offers respondents 
anonymity in their responses (Rea et al, 1997).   
Survey Composition.   
 Each survey question included closed-ended items, which offered several 
advantages to the survey design.  One advantage was that “the set of alternative answers 
is uniform and therefore facilitates comparisons among respondents” (Rea et al, 1997).  
Answer uniformity allows comparisons across sample population characteristics, such as 
professional organization affiliation or years of service.  Uniform data collection also 
allows for easier data manipulation during the analysis stage, as data do not require 
intermediate formatting to ensure conformity (Rea et al, 1997).  Closed-ended questions 
tend to be clearer than open-ended questions:  “…the fixed list of response possibilities 
tends to make the question clearer to the respondent.  A respondent who may otherwise 
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be uncertain about the question can be enlightened as to its intent by the answer 
categories” (Rea et al, 1997).     
 Survey Item Construction. 
 The following sections discuss construction of each question on the survey.  A 
copy of the survey can be found at Appendix D. 
  Demographics.   
 The survey first asked four demographic questions:  state in which the individual 
currently works, years in law enforcement, primary duty description, and professional 
organization.  The state in which an individual works was recorded to ensure that 
responses were collected from a variety of geographic areas.  This information was 
important to determine if responses were received from only one geographic area, which 
could limit the generalizability of the results.  Years in law enforcement indicates the 
level of experience the respondent has.  This was an important factor because the greater 
the experience level of the respondent, the more exposure to criminal justice information 
systems they are likely to have had—usually, only the higher ranking officers will have 
regular access to these systems.  Primary duty description was also an important 
demographic because certain LE jobs don’t require access to criminal justice information 
systems.  This demographic information helped to identify individuals who weren’t part 
of the target audience and, therefore, identified responses that should be eliminated from 
the results.  Finally, the professional organization (FOP, IACP, or CIO) to which the 
individual belongs was recorded.  It was posited that responses might be significantly 
different between the populations and collecting this demographic could help to identify 
those differences.  
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  Section 1:  Degree of Use of Federal Information Systems  
The first survey question asked users to indicate the degree to which they used 22 
federal criminal justice information systems which they were regularly able to access 
within their department.  Responses could be chosen from a six-point Likert scale, 
ranging from “never” to “constantly” (Schmitt et al, 1991).  For system descriptions of 
the 22 federal criminal justice information systems cit ed in this survey, see Appendix B.   
 Section 2:  Perceptions of Usefulness of Federal Information Systems 
The next question asked respondents to assess the usefulness of each of the 22 
systems they were able to access.  Responses could be chosen from a five-point Likert 
scale, ranging from “not useful” to “extremely useful” (Faculty Exchange Program, 2002; 
Sheard et al, 2000).   
Documentation on the various federal criminal justice information systems 
contained superficial information about how many users could access the system.  
However, information about how often users access these systems or how useful each 
system is perceived to be is not captured (Dempsey, 2001)—thus, prompting the first two 
survey questions. 
 Section 3:  Perceptions of IS Environmental Factors Influencing Use 
The final twenty-four questions asked respondents to judge the degree to which 
they agreed with statements concerning environmental factors of federal criminal justice 
information systems.  Respondents chose responses from a five-point Likert scale, 
ranging from “completely disagree” to “completely agree” (Siegle, 2002).   
These questions were divided into four sections, corresponding to the IS 
environmental factor (access, system quality, information quality, and trust) to which the 
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question applied.  Questions for each environmental factor were derived from the IS 
issues identified as significant to the LE arena in the “Information Systems 
Environmental Factors” section of Chapter 2.  Survey questions 3 through 8 related to the 
construct of access.  The disparity of Congressional testimony statements about the level 
of federal IS access afforded to state/local LE officials prompted survey questions #3 and 
#6:  #3 asks whether federal LE information systems provide adequate support to state 
and local LE organizations while #6 asks whether federal LE agencies collaborate well 
with state and local organizations through information systems.  Survey question #7 deals 
with the concept of technological access discussed in Chapter 2.  This question was 
intended to ascertain whether state/local LE officials support the claim that federal LE 
information system programs take state/local LE agency IT capabilities into account.  
References about criminal justice information system access controls that could 
potentially limit the capabilities of state/local LE officials toward mission effectiveness 
prompted survey questions #4, #5, and #8:  respectively, whether federal LE agencies 
allow access to case-related information to complete state/local LE missions, whether 
federal LE agencies allow access to classified information to complete state/local LE 
missions, and whether state/local LE agencies have access to the federal criminal justice 
information networks necessary to complete missions effectively.   
Survey questions 9 through 12 related to the construct of system quality.  Several 
federal LE agency directors, including the U.S. Attorney General and FBI Director, 
voiced major concerns about the currency of federal criminal justice information system 
technology.  These concerns prompted survey question #10:  whether state/local LE 
officials perceive federal criminal justice information system technology to be behind-
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the-times.  Doubts about the currency of federal criminal justice information system 
technology led to another concern: whether federal criminal justice information systems 
can support the range of different network implementations that exist at state/local levels.  
This prompted survey question #9:  whether federal LE information systems are flexible 
enough to support state/local LE agency networks.  Due to the sensitivity of information 
contained on these networks, security is a continual concern.  This concern prompted 
survey question #11:  whether state/local LE officials perceive information contained on 
federal criminal justice information systems to be adequately protected.  In the literature 
review, several documents suggested that interpersonal relationships may still be the 
preferred method of communicating information in the LE community.  These statements 
prompted survey question #12:  whether state/local LE officers feel they get more 
information from federal LE agencies through interpersonal contact than through 
electronic systems.   
Survey questions 13 through 18 related to the construct of information quality.  
The disparity between the value of information at the local and federal levels as 
demonstrated by the Rowley example sparked survey question #13:  whether state/local 
LE officials believe their department is sometimes more informed about situations than 
federal LE offices.  The successful implementation of KCJIS prompted a similar 
question, survey question #15:  whether state/local LE officials believe state-run criminal 
justice information networks provide more helpful information than federal criminal 
justice information systems.  Doubts about the accuracy of information contained on INS 
systems prompted survey question #14: whether state/local LE officials believe the 
information contained on federal criminal justice information networks is accurate.  
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Update frequency of information contained on criminal justice information systems is 
another problem associated with INS information systems.  This issue prompted survey 
question #16: whether state/local LE officials believe the information contained on 
federal criminal justice information networks is updated frequently enough.  A study of 
federal criminal information systems completed by the Center for Democracy and 
Technology identified the issue of how long information should be kept in IS databases.  
This issue prompted survey questions #17 and #18:  whether state/local LE officials 
believe the information contained on federal criminal justice information networks is kept 
long enough or discarded too quickly. 
Survey questions 19 through 26 related to the construct of trust.  How open a 
relationship between two entities is can affect the level of trust in the relationship.  The 
literature identified a considerable disparity in the perceived openness of the relationship 
between federal LEAs and state/local LEAs, and this disparity prompted survey questions 
#19 and #20:  #19 asks whether state/local LE officials believe that federal LE agencies 
readily share information/resources when a need is identified and #20 asks whether 
state/local LE officials believe that federal LE agencies quickly respond to requests for 
information or help.  Questions about the accuracy of information contained on federal 
criminal justice information systems imply the source of information could be the fault.  
This provoked survey question #21:  whether state/local LE officials trust the information 
received from federal LE agencies.  Additionally, perceptions about federal agencies’ 
abilities to carry out duties or effectively complete missions can impact trust.  In 
Congressional testimony, several federal LEA directors testified that the capabilities of 
their agencies were severely impacted by personnel shortages, funding shortfalls, and 
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other factors.  These staggering statements provoked survey questions #22, #23, and #24:  
#22 asks whether state/local LE officials trust the capabilities of federal LE agencies to 
gather effective intelligence about emerging threats, #23 asks whether state/local LE 
officials trust federal LE agencies’ abilities to react to emerging, critical situations, and 
#24 asks whether state/local LE officials believe federal LE agencies are prepared to deal 
with the existing level of serious national criminal activities.  Finally, the quality of 
interaction and acceptance of feedback were identified as factors that can affect the level 
of trust.  These concepts sparked the final survey questions, #25 and #26:  #25 asks 
whether state/local LE officials are satisfied with federal LE agencies’ day-to-day 
interactions with their departments and #26 asks whether state/local LE officials believe 
federal LE agencies are receptive to feedback from their departments. 
It is important to note that the survey question sets in this research were not 
copied from an existing survey instrument.  All questions were created by the author 
based on information gained through the literature review.  Survey questions sets were 
formed to represent the constructs as relating specifically to federal criminal justice 
information systems.   
 Sample Population. 
The total population of this research effort is defined as all state and local LE 
employees with on- line capabilities who subscribe to at least one federal criminal justice 
information system.  The total number of individuals in this population is approximately 
675,000 (Higgins K., 2002).   
The survey’s sample population included state bureau of investigations Chief 
Information Officers (CIOs) and members of LE professional organizations that agreed to 
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take the survey, including several districts of the International Association of Chiefs of 
Police (IACP) and the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP).  These professional organizations 
were chosen because they represent a cross-section of U.S. criminal justice information 
system users.  Organizational membership is based on integration within the law 
enforcement profession and not bounded by race, culture, age, or gender restrictions.  
Below is a brief description of each professional organization and the reasons for 
inclusion in the survey sample population. 
 State Bureau of Investigations CIOs:  Each state operates an LE agency similar to 
the FBI.  State- level bureaus perform comparable functions as the FBI, with a limited 
range of authority—usually within the borders of their parent state with cooperative LE 
agreements among neighboring states.  Each state bureau of investigations employs a 
CIO to oversee information systems and networks within their jurisdiction.  Additionally, 
CIOs are users of these systems.  Because state bureaus of investigation are a primary 
link between federal LE agencies and state/local LE organizations, the CIOs within these 
organizations may be able to offer valuable insight on the questions this research seeks to 
answer.  Therefore, CIOs have been chosen as one of the three representative groups in 
the sample population.     
 International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP):  The IACP has over 19,000 
members in over 100 countries (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2002).  
Overall objectives of this LE professional organization are to “advance the science and 
art of police services…foster police cooperation and the exchange of information and 
experience among police administrators throughout the world…and to encourage 
adherence of all police officers to high professional standards of performance and 
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conduct” (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2002).  The IACP’s membership 
is comprised of high-ranking LE officials in many high population areas, including the 
major U.S. cities.  The IACP was targeted for representation in the sample population 
because of the broad authority, experience level, and leadership insight that members 
would be able to provide. 
 Fraternal Order of Police (FOP):  The FOP began in 1915 as a union for law 
enforcement personnel in order to improve working conditions; however, the 
organization has expanded its mission to provide improved law enforcement capabilities, 
enhance professionalism among law enforcement personnel, and encourage community 
service.  Today, the FOP is the largest professional police organization in the US with 
more than 2,100 local lodges and 300,000 members (Fraternal Order of Police, 2002).  
FOP members include detectives, beat officers, desk clerks, highway patrol—the wide 
range of LE specialties at various rank levels.  Because FOP membership is not bounded 
to leadership strata, this organization offers the perspective of the average state/local 
criminal justice information system user—a valuable perspective for this research effort.   
 Research Design Quality Considerations. 
 This section presents considerations for the research design quality of this 
research.  Internal and external validity are addressed.  Additionally, the methodology for 
measuring reliability of each of the constructs is presented.  
  Internal Validity. 
The research methodology attempted to minimize bias.  According to Rea et al, 
use of a survey format reduces interviewer- induced bias:  “the mail-out questionnaire 
exposes each respondent to precisely the same wording on questions.  Thus, it is not 
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subject to interviewer-induced bias in terms of voice inflection, misreading of the 
questions, or other clerical or administrative errors” (1997).   
 Attrition bias occurs when respondents submit incomplete responses; e.g., 
answering only some of the questions on the survey while leaving others blank.  This 
type of bias was addressed by several factors of the survey’s design.  As mentioned 
earlier, the survey allows respondents take the survey at their own pace, in their chosen 
environment, and at their chosen time.  These factors, in addition to the survey’s brevity, 
are intended to encourage respondents to complete the survey.   
 Coverage bias, or systematic omission, occurs when sections of the target 
population have been omitted from the sample population.  For example, coverage bias 
would be present in the results of a survey about homelessness in New York City if 
survey participants included only homeless individuals who visited shelters throughout 
the city.  Coverage bias would be introduced because the results would not reflect the 
characteristics of homeless individuals who do not patronize shelters.  The selection of 
the sample population intended to minimize coverage bias by including the widest 
possib le range of state/local LE officials.  Inclusion of the IACP membership was 
intended to gain perspectives from state/local LE leadership while FOP membership was 
intended to gain perspectives from all job and rank classes, and inclusion of the CIOs was 
intended to specifically gain IS manager perspectives.  As discussed earlier, utilizing 
professional organization membership minimizes restrictions on age, race, culture, and 
gender.  Finally, the usage of a web-based survey is justified as the survey is intended to 
gain assessments on criminal justice information systems from Internet users. 
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 Self-selection within the sample population does introduce some bias (Rea et al, 
1997).  “Essentially, when people decide to participate in a survey, they select 
themselves.  This decision may reflect some systematic selecting principle or judgement 
that affects the collected data” (GVU, 1994).  Despite this, the amount of self-selection 
bias has been deemed to be minimal and, therefore, acceptable.   
  Content Validity. 
 This research was also concerned about content validity: “the extent to which the 
content of the measurement instrument reflects what is supposed to be measured” 
(Shannon et al, 2001).  Content validity was assessed using internal consistency 
measures, which assesses the consistency of items within a measurement instrument 
(Shannon et al, 2001).   
 A pretest was conducted to evaluate the face/content validity of the survey 
instrument.  The survey’s pretest was threefold.  The first phase of pre-testing included a 
general review by 23 AFIT graduate students.  This phase was intended to detect minor 
items such as typos, unclear wording, confusing design, and survey functionality.  During 
this phase, three minor typos were detected.  Participants deemed the survey’s design was 
easy to use and navigate, and the survey’s implementation appeared fully functional.  A 
more accurate estimate of the time needed to complete the survey was also gained from 
this phase of the pilot test.  The second phase involved an assessment by AFIT faculty 
members on my thesis review board.  AFIT faculty members reviewed the survey’s form, 
wording, appearance, consistency, execution strategy, and academic support for the 
concepts incorporated within the questions.  In response to feedback from this phase of 
the pretest, the order of survey questions was rearranged.  Each question was reordered 
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into sections corresponding to the construct to which they applied:  access, system 
quality, information quality, or trust.  Additionally, several survey questions were 
reworded to provide more clarity, and Likert scale wording was changed to correspond to 
previously proven scales.  The final phase of the pretest consisted of a review by law 
enforcement professionals from two organizations:  the Fraternal Order of Police research 
department and the Ohio Peace Officer Training Academy.  These LE experts were asked 
to review the survey to ensure each question was clear, unambiguous, and relevant.  
These respondents were also asked to discern if questions were appropriate toward 
obtaining the stated research objectives.  In response to feedback from this phase, minor 
wording changes were made to provide more clarity to six survey questions.   
  External Validity.  
Due to the cross-sectional design of this survey, the results will be externally valid 
only if the sample is representative of the total population (Fink, 1995).  While the survey 
did not randomly select participants, the distribution methodology described above was 
intended to minimize any systematic effect introduced by the sampling method.  While 
this may not be optimal, the survey methodology was deemed valid, given the 
permission-based constraints of gaining full distribution—or any distribution, for that 
matter.  These factors do not invalidate the findings of this research, however, may 
constrain the generalizability of the results to the entire LE population (GVU, 1994).   
  Reliability.  
Reliability was tested after both the pretest and the final survey administration to 
document the ins trument’s performance.  Reliability for the sections regarding the IS 
environmental factors was measured utilizing SPSS statistical software, which uses the 
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coefficient alpha to test for consistency.  The coefficient alpha “represents the average of 
all possible split-half estimates” (Shannon et al, 2001).  The split-half method 
demonstrates “the extent to which items perform as consistent measures of a single 
construct” (Shannon et al, 2001).     
All responses to the open-ended question at the end of the survey were examined 
to determine what additional opinions about federal criminal justice information systems 
were reported by survey respondents.  Any significant comments on federal criminal 
justice information systems were presented as additional findings in the “Results” section 
of Chapter 4. 
Conduct of the Research 
 Pilot test .   
A pilot test was conducted to ensure the survey’s clarity, acceptability, and 
comprehensiveness.  The survey was administered to LE classes (46 total individuals) at 
the Ohio Peace Officer Training Academy (OPOTA) located in London, Ohio.  The 
purpose and intent of the survey was explained prior to administering.  The OPOTA 
students were then asked to review the survey to assess the following factors:  identify 
questions that were unclear, ambiguous, or otherwise difficult to answer; evaluate 
whether the length of the questionnaire was acceptable; determine whether information 
gathered in the survey would invade the privacy of respondents or otherwise violate 
ethical and moral standards; and judge the relevance of each question and whether 
response choices demonstrated the complete range of alternatives (Rea et al, 1997).   
 
 
53 
 Coordination for Sample Population. 
The research department at the IACP national office recommended the survey be 
distributed through state-level points of contact in states that agreed to participate in the 
survey.  The line of logic was that membership information would be more accurate at 
the state level.  Contact information (name and phone number and/or email address) for 
state- level professional organization representatives was gained through a quick Internet 
search.  This information was logged in a master database for future reference.   
 Each representative was then contacted by phone to enlist their cooperation in 
distributing the survey web address to their district’s membership.  Some state offices 
agreed to cooperate with the research program, and some declined.  States that agreed to 
participate in the survey included Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Ohio, and 
Texas.   
 Mailing addresses for the state bureau of investigations CIOs were also collected 
from the Internet.  CIOs were not contacted by phone in advance.  Instead, all 50 CIOs 
were contacted by mail at the time the survey was implemented.   
 Human Subject Review. 
A human subject review was conducted to ensure that individual safety and 
privacy were protected throughout the course of this research.  A review request was 
submitted on 6 December, 2002.  The Air Force Research Laboratories Experimental 
Safety Office (AFRL/HEH) at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, convened a 
review board in accordance with Air Force Instruction 40-402 to assess the safety and 
privacy considerations of this research effort.  The survey methodology was approved on 
7 January, 2003; human subject review control number FWR 2003-0040-E.   
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 Data Collection. 
The survey consisted of 26 questions (see Appendix D).  The survey was executed 
primarily in an on- line format, accessible from any Internet-capable terminal.  During 
implementation of the survey, 15,000 emails were sent out to law enforcement personnel.  
The email contained a brief description of the survey and asked recipients to participate 
in the survey.  Recipients could access the survey through a URL attached to the email 
message.  Concurrently, fifty hard-copy mailings containing the same survey were 
delivered to the CIOs of state bureaus of investigation.  According to Rea et al (1997), 
with the relatively small total population representing the LE community, a minimum 
number of 348 responses is required to obtain a statistically valid representation.   
Data Analysis Strategies. 
The following sections present the data analysis strategies for this research.   
 Data Analysis Strategies for Research Questions #1 and #2. 
To answer research questions #1 and #2, the 22 systems studied in this research 
for frequency of use and perceived usefulness were ranked by a combined frequency of 
use/perceived usefulness score.  The combined score was calculated by multiplying the 
mean frequency of use for each system by the corresponding mean perceived usefulness.  
Higher means indicated a greater frequency of use and higher degree of usefulness; 
therefore, systems were ranked based on the mean scores of these two characteristics.  
This method does not take into account the standard deviation of responses.  Therefore, 
systems were also ranked via Kendall’s tau and differences in the results of each method 
were analyzed. 
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As stated in the section discussing the research questions, comparisons will be 
made between subsets of the sample population to determine if statistically significant 
differences in responses can be observed.  Two comparisons will be made:  by service 
time and by membership in professional organization.  To determine if the subset of the 
population broken out by high or low service time differed significantly, a comparison 
was made using a z statistic which compares the means of two sample populations.  Since 
both subsets of the population are relatively large (over 30), the CLT can be invoked.   
To determine if the subset of the population broken out by professional 
organization membership differed significantly, a comparison was made using a t test 
which compares the means of two sample populations.  The t test was used in this 
comparison because the IACP subset of the sample population contained only 16 entries.  
Because this number does not exceed the threshold for invoking the CLT, the z statistic 
method used previously would not produce valid results.  However, the t test is designed 
to compare population means when the size of one or both of the subpopulations does not 
exceed the CLT threshold. 
 Data Analysis Strategies for Research Question #3. 
To determine if mean values of questions about the IS environmental factors 
differed significantly from the expected mean, a comparison was made between the 
expected mean and the observed mean using a z statistic, which compares the means of 
two populations.  Because the range of answers is discrete and not continuous, a z-
statistic can be used only if it can be shown that the distribution of the z statistic 
possesses nearly the same shape as the theoretical t distribution for populations that are 
nonnormal—in other words, the probability distribution must be mound-shaped if not 
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normally distributed.  This is especially true for Likert scale questions, since a Likert 
scale question with only 5 possible answers cannot possibly possess a normal probability 
distribution.  Therefore, results of these z-tests cannot be used for hard scientific proof, 
but indications of trends in the data (Shannon et al, 2001).  Since the population is 
relatively large (over 30), the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) can be invoked.     
 As stated in the section discussing the research questions, comparisons will be 
made between subsets of the sample population to determine if statistically significant 
differences in responses can be observed.  Two comparisons will be made:  by service 
time and by membership in professional organization.  To determine if the subset of the 
population broken out by high or low service time differed significantly, a comparison 
was made using a z statistic which compares the means of two sample populations.  Since 
both subsets of the population are relatively large (over 30), the CLT can be invoked.   
To determine if the subset of the population broken out by professional 
organization membership differed significantly, a comparison was made using a t test 
which compares the means of two sample populations.  The t test was used in this 
comparison because the IACP subset of the sample population contained only 16 entries.  
Because this number does not exceed the threshold for invoking the CLT, the z statistic 
method used previously would not produce valid results.  However, the t test is designed 
to compare population means when the size of one or both of the subpopulations does not 
exceed the CLT threshold. 
 Comparison of Mail-out vs. Web-based Responses.    
As discussed earlier in this chapter, responses must be analyzed to determine if 
responses differed significantly because of the mixed method approach for data 
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collection.  To determine if the subset of the population broken out by response format 
differed significantly, a comparison was made using a t test which compares the means of 
two sample populations.  The t test was used in this comparison because the mail-out 
participant subset of the sample population contains only ten entries.  Same as the 
previous comparison, this number does not exceed the threshold for invoking the CLT; 
therefore, the z statistic method used previously would not produce valid results.  
However, the t test is designed to compare population means when the size of one or both 
of the subpopulations does not exceed the CLT threshold.   
Summary 
 This chapter presented the methodology for this research.  The principal factors 
for choosing a survey-based, quantitative research design were reviewed.  The three 
research questions were further clarified, with in-depth explanations of the intent and 
verbiage of each question.  Procedures for constructing the survey including format and 
composition considerations were described.  The sample population was depicted in an 
in-depth analysis, including why those sections of the target population were chosen as 
participants.  Validation and reliability issues were also discussed.  Additionally, a survey 
pretest and a three-fold pilot test were conducted to ensure instrument clarity, 
appropriateness, and effectiveness.  The results of these tests were presented in the write-
up.  Human subject review board results and coordination efforts for distribution of the 
survey to the target audience were presented.  Finally, data collection and data analysis 
strategies were outlined.  The next chapter presents the results of the data collection 
methodology described above.   
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 IV. Findings and Analysis 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter presents the results of the data collection phase of this research 
effort.  The following sections include information about the survey’s response rate and 
the demographics of respondents.  Procedures for analyzing the data are described, and 
the results of each survey item are delineated.  Segments of the sample population are 
examined for significant differences in responses with respect to each research question.  
Finally, responses from the sample population are compared based on response method to 
detect statistically significant differences due to survey format, a possible limitation of 
this research effort.   
Findings 
 Response Rate. 
 During implementation of the survey, 15,000 emails were sent out to law 
enforcement personnel through the state points of contact.  Of the 15,000 law 
enforcement personnel contacted, 367 accessed the on- line survey.  Seven of these 
responses were incomplete.  Incomplete responses were discarded from the results, 
leaving 360 valid responses to the on- line survey, for an overall 2.4% return rate on the 
web-based format.  Additionally, twelve of the 50 state bureau CIOs returned the mail-
out survey, for a 24% return rate on the mail-out format.  This response rate (372) 
exceeded the minimum number of responses (348) necessary to statistically validate 
research results. 
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 Demographic Analysis. 
 The following paragraphs present information relating to the demographics 
collected on the survey.  Collected demographics include state in which the respondent 
works, years in law enforcement, primary duty description, and professional organization 
to which the respondent belongs. 
  Responses by State. 
 The first demographic question asked the respondent in which state they currently 
work.  This information was collected to determine if responses were received from only 
one geographic area, which could limit the generalizability of the results.  Responses 
were received from 27 states representing a wide geographic dispersion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1:  Responses by State in Which Respondent Worked 
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 Ohio produced the most responses at 64, followed by Texas (42), Kansas (37), 
Florida (34), Pennsylvania (31), and Illinois (30).  These six states produced almost two-
thirds of the total responses; 237 out of the 372 valid responses or 63.97% of the total 
response rate.  The least number of responses came from Idaho, Maryland, Missouri, 
New Hampshire, New Mexico, Nevada, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and Wyoming—each 
with one response. 
  Years in Law Enforcement. 
 The second demographic question asked the respondent how long they had 
worked in the law enforcement profession.  This was an important factor because the 
greater the experience level of the respondent, the more exposure to criminal justice 
information systems they are likely to have had.  Years of experience ranged from one 
year and eleven months to forty years of service.  The average amount of experience was 
nine years and eight months.  Out of the total number of valid responses, 161 respondents 
fell above and 211 respondents fell below the average amount of experience.   
  Primary Duty Description. 
 The third demographic question asked respondents to report their primary duty 
description.  This demographic was recorded to identify individuals who may not be part 
of the target audience and, therefore, identify responses that should be eliminated from 
the results.  Each of the respondents reported at least some experience with federal 
criminal justice information systems, so none of the 372 complete responses were 
discarded on the basis of primary duty description. 
 Participants were given five choices for primary duty description:  Patrol, 
Supervisor, Investigator, Administration, and Other.  Of the 372 valid responses, 262 
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reported “Patrol” as their primary duty description, representing 70.43% of the total 
responses.  Thirty-one respondents reported “Supervisor” and 34 respondents reported 
“Investigator” as their primary duty description.  Only one respondent recorded 
“Administration” as the primary duty description.  Of the 372 respondents, 32 chose 
“Other.”  Respondents who chose “Other” were not asked to provide alternate 
descriptions ; however, because each of the respondents indicated some experience with 
federal CJIS, none of these respondents were removed from the final results.  Twelve of 
the 372 respondents were CIOs.   
  Professional Organization. 
 The final demographic question asked respondents to report which professional 
organization they belonged.  Respondents were given three choices for professional 
organization:  Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), International Association of Chiefs of 
Police (IACP), and Neither.  Out of the total number of valid responses, 340 respondents 
belonged to the FOP, 16 respondents were members of the IACP, and 4 recorded 
“Neither.”  The four respondents reporting “Neither” were removed from the final results.  
CIOs were not asked to report professional organization.  The wide gap between the 
number of responses from the FOP and the number of responses from the IACP is to be 
expected since the FOP is a much larger organization than the IACP.  The FOP reports 
that its total membership is approximately 300,000 as compared to the total reported 
IACP membership of 19,000.   
Reliability Test Results. 
The next sections present the results of the reliability tests performed for both the 
pilot test and actual results.   
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 Pilot Test Reliability Results. 
According to Rea et al (1997), pilot test sample size should be 40-60 individuals.  
The pilot test sample size for this research was 46 LE students (n = 46) attending classes 
at the Ohio Peace Officer Training Academy in London, Ohio at the time the pilot test 
was conducted.     
  Reliability Results for Frequency of Use and Usefulness. 
Since the first two questions asked participants to rate their frequency of use and 
perceived usefulness of 22 mutually exclusive federal criminal justice information 
systems, a study of correlation measures would yield unusable information.  However, a 
coefficient alpha was calcula ted for items one and two of the survey instrument.  Q1 
yielded a coefficient alpha of .7423, and Q2 yielded a coefficient alpha of .9796.  Both 
values exceed the minimum desired coefficient alpha of .7 (Hair et al, 1995; Nunnally, 
1978).  These measures indicate that the 22 subquestions of Q1 and Q2 perform 
consistently to measure the constructs for each item:  frequency of use and perceived 
usefulness, respectively. 
  Reliability Results for IS Environmental Factors. 
Before reliability tests were conducted on the remaining 24 questions, the items 
were divided into groups, according to which IS environmental factor they were posited 
to support: access (questions 3-8), system quality (questions 9-12), information quality 
(questions 13-18), and trust (questions 19-26).   
   Reliability Results for the “Access” Construct. 
 The correlation matrix in Table 2 shows the r values for all questions supporting 
the IS environmental factor called access.  An r value describes how interrelated each 
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item is with other items.  As the r value increases, the more interrelated the items are.  
With an n = 46 (the number of LE students participating in the pilot test), the minimum r 
(at p = .05) is .2908 (McClave et al, 2001).  The lowest r value in Table 2 is between Q5 
and Q8 at .3131, which exceeds the minimum r.  The highest r value in the table is 
between Q3 and Q4 at .7222, which means the highest degree of correlation in this set of 
questions occurs between Q3 and Q4.  These values simply mean that these six survey 
items collectively represented the construct called “access.” 
 
 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 
Q3 1.0000      
Q4 0.7222 1.0000     
Q5 0.3862 0.6706 1.0000    
Q6 0.4600 0.5474 0.5805 1.0000   
Q7 0.5405 0.6088 0.7085 0.5312 1.0000  
Q8 0.4092 0.5009 0.3131 0.5799 0.4692 1.0000 
 
Table 2:  Pretest Correlation Matrix for Questions Supporting Access Construct 
 
Table 3 displays the results of several correlative measures between items 
supporting the IS environmental factor called access.  The “Corrected Item-Total 
Correlation” column indicates how consistent items are with the scale to total.  Shannon 
et al (2001) argues that a minimum consistency measure of .5 is desirable.  The lowest 
consistency measure in Table 3 is .5614 (Q8), which exceeds the minimum desired value.  
The “Squared Multiple Correlation” column indicates how much variance is accounted 
for in each item (Shannon et al, 2001).  Each item in Table 3 accounts for a considerable 
percentage of variance:  the lowest value occurs at Q8 at .4587.   
The “Inter-Item Correlation Values” column compares the minimum and 
maximum r values from the correlation matrix, which helps to determine inter-item 
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consistency.  A ratio of 1:1 is desirable with a variance as close to 0 as possible (Shannon 
et al, 2001).  Table 3 indicates a Max/Min ratio of 2.3066 with a variance of .0132.  The 
overall coefficient alpha is .8709, which exceeds the minimum desired coefficient alpha 
of .7 (Hair et al, 1995; Nunnally, 1978).   Again, all these values simply mean that these 
six survey items correlated to represent the single construct called “access.”  
 
 Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
 Inter-Item 
Correlation 
Values 
 
Q3 0.6324 0.6044    
Q4 0.7921 0.7292  Max/Min: 2.3066 
Q5 0.6605 0.7007  Variance: 0.0132 
Q6 0.6807 0.5312    
Q7 0.7257 0.6223    
Q8 0.5614 0.4587    
      
  Alpha = 0.8709   
 
Table 3:  Pretest ANOVA for Questions Supporting Access Construct  
 
 
 
   Reliability Results for the “System Quality” Construct. 
 The correlation matrix in Table 4 shows the r values for all questions supporting 
the IS environmental factor called system quality.  With an n = 46, the minimum r (at p = 
.05) is .2908.  Only one r value in Table 4, between Q10 and Q12 at .3131, exceeds the 
minimum r.  All other r values in the table fall below the minimum, and three r values are 
negative.  This suggests that the items may be mutually exclusive, and they don’t 
adequately represent the “system quality” construct.   
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 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 
Q9 1.0000    
Q10 -0.0606 1.0000   
Q11 0.0974 -0.0315 1.0000  
Q12 -0.0540 0.3929 0.0268 1.0000 
 
Table 4:  Pretest Correlation Matrix for Questions Supporting System Quality Construct 
 
 
 Table 5 displays the results of several correlative measures between items 
supporting the IS environmental factor called system quality.  The “Corrected Item-Total 
Correlation” column indicates how consistent items are with the scale to total.  Shannon 
et al (2001) argues that a minimum consistency measure of .5 is desirable.  The highest 
consistency measure in Table 5 is .2719 (Q12), far below the minimum desired value.  
This indicates that these survey items do not correlate to represent a single construct.  The 
“Squared Multiple Correlation” column indicates how much variance is accounted for in 
each item (Shannon et al, 2001).  Each item in Table 5 accounts for minor percentages of 
variance:  the highest value occurs at Q10 at .1574.  These low correlative measures are 
further evidence that these items may be mutually exclusive. 
 Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
 Inter-Item 
Correlation 
Values 
 
Q9 -0.0151 0.0142    
Q10 0.1976 0.1574  Max/Min: -6.4798 
Q11 0.0475 0.0122  Variance: 0.0271 
Q12 0.2179 0.1571    
      
  Alpha = 0.2236   
 
 Table 5:  Pretest ANOVA for Questions Supporting System Quality Construct 
 
 
 The “Inter-Item Correlation Values” column compares the minimum and 
maximum r values from the correlation matrix, which helps to determine inter-item 
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consistency.  A ratio of 1:1 is desirable with a variance as close to 0 as possible (Shannon 
et al, 2001).  Table 5 indicates a Max/Min ratio of -6.4798 with a variance of .0271.  The 
overall coefficient alpha is .2236, far below the minimum desired coefficient alpha of .7 
(Hair et al, 1995; Nunnally, 1978).  Again, these values suggest that survey items 9-12 
did not correlate to represent a single construct.   
   Reliability Results for the “Information Quality” Construct. 
The correlation matrix in Table 6 shows the r values for all questions supporting 
the IS environmental factor called information quality.  With an n = 46, the minimum r 
(at p = .05) is .2908 (McClave et al, 2001).  Only three r values in Table 6 exceed the 
minimum r.  All other r values in the table fall below the minimum, and five r values are 
negative.  These values indicate that these survey items did not correlate well to represent 
a single construct. 
 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 
Q13 1.0000      
Q14 0.0458 1.0000     
Q15 0.2662 0.2989 1.0000    
Q16 -0.1708 0.3536 0.1423 1.0000   
Q17 -0.0978 0.1015 0.0199 0.5110 1.0000  
Q18 0.2069 -0.0283 0.1322 -0.1770 -0.0706 1.0000 
 
Table 6:  Pretest Correlation Matrix for Questions Supporting Information Quality Construct 
 
 
 Table 7 displays the results of several correlative measures between items 
supporting the IS environmental factor called information quality.  The “Corrected Item-
Total Correlation” column indicates how consistent items are with the scale to total.  
Shannon et al (2001) argues that a minimum consistency measure of .5 is desirable.  The 
highest consistency measure in Table 7 is .3586 (Q15), far below the minimum desired 
value.  The “Squared Multiple Correlation” column indicates how much variance is 
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accounted for in each item (Shannon et al, 2001).  Each item in Table 7 accounts for 
minor percentages of variance:  the highest value occurs at Q16 at .3932. These values 
simply indicate that these six survey items did not adequately correlate to represent the 
single construct called “information quality.”  
 Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
 Inter-Item 
Correlation 
Values 
 
Q13 0.0890 0.1346    
Q14 0.3035 0.1953  Max/Min: -2.8877 
Q15 0.3586 0.1739  Variance: 0.0385 
Q16 0.2037 0.3932    
Q17 0.1611 0.2701    
Q18 0.0502 0.0768    
      
  Alpha = 0.3951   
 
Table 7:  Pretest ANOVA for Questions Supporting Information Quality Construct 
 
 The “Inter-Item Correlation Values” column compares the minimum and 
maximum r values from the correlation matrix, which helps to determine inter-item 
consistency.  A ratio of 1:1 is desirable with a variance as close to 0 as possible (Shannon 
et al, 2001).  Table 7 indicates a Max/Min ratio of -2.8877 with a variance of .0385.  The 
overall coefficient alpha is .3951, far below the minimum desired coefficient alpha of .7 
(Hair et al, 1995; Nunnally, 1978).  Again, these values simply indicate that survey items 
13-18 did not correlate to represent a single construct. 
   Reliability Results for the “Trust” Construct. 
 The correlation matrix in Table 8 shows the r values for all questions supporting 
the IS environmental factor called trust.  With an n = 46, the minimum r (at p = .05) is 
.2908 (McClave et al, 2001).  Six r values in the table fall below the minimum.  The 
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lowest r value in the table is .1616 between Q22 and Q26.  The highest r value in the 
table is between Q22 and Q23 at .8708.  These values simply mean that these eight 
survey items collectively represented the construct called “trust.” 
 
 Q19 Q20 Q21 Q22 Q23 Q24 Q25 Q26 
Q19 1.0000        
Q20 0.4297 1.0000       
Q21 0.3308 0.3435 1.0000      
Q22 0.2017 0.1810 0.5332 1.0000     
Q23 0.2951 0.2315 0.5332 0.8708 1.0000    
Q24 0.3156 0.4307 0.3649 0.5724 0.7377 1.0000   
Q25 0.4683 0.5211 0.2311 0.2991 0.3821 0.4239 1.0000  
Q26 0.3231 0.5947 0.3264 0.1616 0.1802 0.2514 0.5695 1.0000 
 
Table 8:  Pretest Correlation Matrix for Questions Supporting Trust Construct 
 
 
 Table 9 displays the results of several correlative measures between items 
supporting the IS environmental factor called trust.  The “Corrected Item-Total 
Correlation” column indicates how consistent items are with the scale to total.  Shannon 
et al (2001) argue that a minimum consistency measure of .5 is desirable.  Two values in 
Table 9 fall below the minimum desired value:  Q19 at .4681 and Q26 at .4702.  The 
“Squared Multiple Correlation” column indicates how much variance is accounted for in 
each item (Shannon et al, 2001).  Each item in Table 9 accounts for a considerable 
percentage of variance:  the lowest value occurs at Q19 at .3129.   
 The “Inter-Item Correlation Values” column compares the minimum and 
maximum r values from the correlation matrix, which helps to determine inter-item 
consistency.  A ratio of 1:1 is desirable with a variance as close to 0 as possible (Shannon 
et al, 2001).  Table 9 indicates a Max/Min ratio of 5.3876 with a variance of .0295.  The 
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overall coefficient alpha is .8415, which exceeds the minimum desired coefficient alpha 
of .7 (Hair et al, 1995; Nunnally, 1978).  Again, these values simply mean that the survey 
items 19-26 adequately correlated to represent the “trust” construct. 
 Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
 Inter-Item 
Correlation 
Values 
 
Q19 0.4681 0.3129    
Q20 0.5428 0.5177  Max/Min: 5.3876 
Q21 0.5505 0.4223  Variance: 0.0295 
Q22 0.6030 0.7786    
Q23 0.7060 0.8571    
Q24 0.6589 0.6406    
Q25 0.5870 0.5030    
Q26 0.4702 0.4783    
      
  Alpha = 0.8415   
 
Table 9:  Pretest ANOVA for Questions Supporting Trust Construct  
 
  Misapplication of Reliability Test Results to Survey. 
 At this point, it is important to point out that the researcher did not change survey 
to correct faults discovered by the reliability test results.  While the reliability test results 
clearly indicate problems with the systems quality and information quality constructs, 
these problems were not corrected prior to the survey’s final application.  This was 
primarily due to two factors.  The first factor was time.  The survey’s on- line format was 
constructed concurrently with the collection of pilot test information.  The survey was 
then launched prior to fully completing and analyzing the reliability test results.  This 
mistake was due to the second factor:  a lack of experience on the part of the researcher.  
To put it simply and honestly, the researcher was unaware of this step in the survey 
design process and skipped it altogether.  To correct the problems with the system quality 
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and information quality constructs, questions in those sections would have been reworded 
or broken up into multiple questions to better represent the construct.  For example, Q10 
which asks whether respondents believed that federal CJIS technology was behind-the-
times could have been reworded to ask whether respondents believed that federal CJIS 
technology was behind-the-times such that is was inadequate to fulfill mission needs.  
Once corrections were made, the pilot test would have been reaccomplished to determine 
if the new survey items adequately represented the system quality and information quality 
constructs. 
  Final Survey Reliability Results. 
 The final survey reliability results are presented in much the same format as the 
pilot test reliability results.  
   Reliability Results for Frequency of Use and Usefulness. 
As with the pilot test, the first two questions asked participants to rate their 
frequency of use and perceived usefulness of 22 mutually exclusive federal criminal 
justice information systems; therefore, a study of correlation measures would yield 
unusable information.  However, a coefficient alpha was calculated for items one and two 
of the survey instrument.  In the post-implementation analysis, Q1 yielded a coefficient 
alpha of .8163, and Q2 yielded a coefficient alpha of .8160.  Both values exceed the 
minimum desired coefficient alpha of .7 (Hair et al, 1995; Nunnally, 1978).  These 
measures indicate that the 22 subquestions of Q1 and Q2 perform consistently to measure 
the constructs for each item:  frequency of use and perceived usefulness, respectively. 
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  Reliability Results for the IS Environmental Factors. 
  As with the reliability tests for the pretest results, the remaining 24 questions 
were divided into groups according to which IS environmental factor they supported 
before reliability tests were conducted: access (questions 3-8), system quality (questions 
9-12), information quality (questions 13-18), and trust (questions 19-26). 
   Reliability Results for the “Access” Construct. 
 The correlation matrix in Table 10 shows the r values for all questions supporting 
the IS environmental factor called access.  An r value describes how interrelated each 
item is with other items.  As the r value increases, the more interrelated the items are.  
With an n = 370, the minimum r (at p = .05) is .1034.  The lowest r value in Table 10 is 
between Q5 and Q8 at .2467, which exceeds the minimum r.  The highest r value in the 
table is between Q3 and Q4 at .6486.  These values suggest that these six items 
consistently measure the access construct. 
 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 
Q3 1.0000      
Q4 0.6486 1.0000     
Q5 0.2982 0.5674 1.0000    
Q6 0.3524 0.4459 0.4566 1.0000   
Q7 0.4217 0.4913 0.5431 0.4195 1.0000  
Q8 0.3697 0.4609 0.2467 0.4850 0.3752 1.0000 
 
Table 10:  Final Survey Correlation Matrix for Questions Supporting Access Construct 
 
 Table 11 displays the results of several correlative measures between items 
supporting the IS environmental factor called access.  The “Corrected Item-Total 
Correlation” column indicates how consistent items are with the scale to total.  Shannon 
et al (2001) argues that a minimum consistency measure of .5 is desirable.  The lowest 
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consistency measure in Table 11 is .5159 (Q8), which exceeds the minimum desired 
value.  The “Squared Multiple Correlation” column indicates how much variance is 
accounted for in each item (Shannon et al, 2001).  Each item in Table 11 accounts for a 
considerable percentage of variance:  the lowest value occurs at Q8 at .3406.   
 The “Inter-Item Correlation Values” column compares the minimum and 
maximum r values from the correlation matrix, which helps to determine inter-item 
consistency.  A ratio of 1:1 is desirable with a variance as close to 0 as possible (Shannon 
et al, 2001).  Table 11 indicates a Max/Min ratio of 1.1184 with a variance of .0205.  The 
overall coefficient alpha is .8233, which exceeds the minimum desired coefficient alpha 
of .7 (Hair et al, 1995; Nunnally, 1978).  These values simply mean that survey items 3-8 
adequately correlate to represent the access construct. 
 Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
 Inter-Item 
Correlation 
Values 
 
Q3 0.5628 0.4593    
Q4 0.7297 0.6072  Max/Min: 1.1184 
Q5 0.5598 0.4756  Variance: 0.0205 
Q6 0.5787 0.3732    
Q7 0.6060 0.4032    
Q8 0.5159 0.3406    
      
  Alpha = 0.8233   
 
Table 11:  Final Survey ANOVA for Questions Supporting Access Construct 
 
   Reliability Results for the “System Quality” Construct. 
 The correlation matrix in Table 12 shows the r values for all questions supporting 
the IS environmental factor called system quality.  With an n = 370, the minimum r (at    
p = .05) is .1034.  Only one r value in Table 12, between Q10 and Q12 at .2618, exceeds 
73 
the minimum r.  All other r values in the table fall below the minimum, and the r value 
between Q9 and Q12 is negative.  This suggests that items may be mutually exclusive 
and that they do not consistently measure the system quality construct.   
 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 
Q9 1.0000    
Q10 0.0210 1.0000   
Q11 0.0812 0.0113 1.0000  
Q12 -0.0582 0.2618 0.0487 1.0000 
 
Table 12:  Final Survey Correlation Matrix for Questions Supporting System Quality Construct 
 
 
 Table 13 displays the results of several correlative measures between items 
supporting the IS environmental factor called system quality.  The “Corrected Item-Total 
Correlation” column indicates how consistent items are with the scale to total.  Shannon 
et al (2001) argues that a minimum consistency measure of .5 is desirable.  The highest 
consistency measure in Table 13 is .1749 (Q10), far below the minimum desired value.  
The “Squared Multiple Correlation” column indicates how much variance is accounted 
for in each item (Shannon et al, 2001).  Each item in Table 13 accounts for minor 
percentages of variance:  the highest value occurs at Q12 at .0752.  These low correlative 
measures are further evidence that these items may be mutually exclusive. 
 Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
 Inter-Item 
Correlation 
Values 
 
Q9 0.0182 0.0119    
Q10 0.1749 0.0699  Max/Min: 1.0609 
Q11 0.0767 0.0095  Variance: 0.0076 
Q12 0.1386 0.0752    
      
  Alpha = 0.2071   
 
Table 13:  Final Survey ANOVA for Questions Supporting System Quality Construct 
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 The “Inter-Item Correlation Values” column compares the minimum and 
maximum r values from the correlation matrix, which helps to determine inter-item 
consistency.  A ratio of 1:1 is desirable with a variance as close to 0 as possible (Shannon 
et al, 2001).  Table 13 indicates a Max/Min ratio of 1.0609 with a variance of .0076.  The 
overall coefficient alpha is .2071, far below the minimum desired coefficient alpha of .7 
(Hair et al, 1995; Nunnally, 1978).  Given this outcome, construct of system quality was 
not supported as a singular concept by the items in this section; therefore, the construct 
was thrown out.   
   Reliability Results for the “Information Quality” Construct. 
The correlation matrix in Table 14 shows the r va lues for all questions supporting 
the IS environmental factor called information quality.  With an n = 370, the minimum r 
(at p = .05) is .1034.  Six r values in Table 14 exceed the minimum r.  All other r values 
in the table fall below the minimum, and seven r values are negative.  These values 
indicate that these survey items did not consistently measure the information quality 
construct as a single construct. 
 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 
Q13 1.0000      
Q14 -0.0226 1.0000     
Q15 0.2027 0.2612 1.0000    
Q16 -0.1376 0.2829 0.1553 1.0000   
Q17 -0.1095 0.0692 -0.0001 0.4127 1.0000  
Q18 0.1548 -0.0405 0.0596 -0.1221 -0.0438 1.0000 
 
Table 14:  Final Survey Correlation Matrix for  
Questions Supporting Information Quality Construct 
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 Table 15 displays the results of several correlative measures between items 
supporting the IS environmental factor called information quality.  The “Corrected Item-
Total Correlation” column indicates how consistent items are with the scale to total.   
Shannon et al (2001) argues that a minimum consistency measure of .5 is desirable.   The 
highest consistency measure in Table 15 is .2907 (Q15), far below the minimum desired 
value.  The “Squared Multiple Correlation” column indicates how much variance is 
accounted for in each item (Shannon et al, 2001).  Each item in Table 15 accounts for 
minor percentages of variance:  the highest value occurs at Q16 at .2637.   
 The “Inter-Item Correlation Values” column compares the minimum and 
maximum r values from the correlation matrix, which helps to determine inter-item 
consistency.  A ratio of 1:1 is desirable with a variance as close to 0 as possible (Shannon 
et al, 2001).  Table 17 indicates a Max/Min ratio of 1.1605 with a variance of .0370.  The 
overall coefficient alpha is .3160, far below the minimum desired coefficient alpha of .7 
(Hair et al, 1995; Nunnally, 1978).  Again, these values suggest that the survey items 13-
18 did not adequately correlate to measure “information quality” as a single construct. 
  
 Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
 Inter-Item 
Correlation 
Values 
 
Q13 0.0288 0.0882    
Q14 0.2178 0.1314  Max/Min: 1.1605 
Q15 0.2907 0.1295  Variance: 0.0370 
Q16 0.2132 0.2637    
Q17 0.1178 0.1778    
Q18 0.0186 0.0374    
      
  Alpha = 0.3160   
 
Table 15:  Final Survey ANOVA for Questions Supporting Information Quality Construct 
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 Because the correlation values between items supporting the information quality 
construct were so low, the researcher examined how the overall coefficient alpha would 
be affected by removing items with the lowest correlative measures.  Table 16 shows the 
effects of removing Q13 and Q18, items with low correlative measures, from the 
reliability test.  Though the overall coefficient alpha did not jump above the minimum 
desirable level, it did improve to .4961.  Because the coefficient alpha did not exceed the 
minimum alpha, this construct was also thrown out.  
 Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
 Inter-Item 
Correlation 
Values 
 
Q14 0.3058 0.1298    
Q15 0.1940 0.0788  Max/Min: 1.1383 
Q16 0.4406 0.2438  Variance: 0.0355 
Q17 0.2348 0.1758    
      
  Alpha = 0.4961   
 
Table 16:  Maximized Post-Implementation ANOVA for  
Questions Supporting Information Quality Construct 
 
   Reliability Results for the “Trust” Construct.    
 The correlation matrix in Table 17 shows the r values for all questions supporting 
the IS environmental factor called trust.  With an n = 370, the minimum r (at p = .05) is 
.1034.  The lowest r value in Table 17 is between Q22 and Q26 at .1310, which exceeds 
the minimum r.  The highest r value in the table is between Q22 and Q23 at .7044.  These 
values indicate that these survey items consistently measured the trust construct. 
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 Q19 Q20 Q21 Q22 Q23 Q24 Q25 Q26 
Q19 1.0000        
Q20 0.3745 1.0000       
Q21 0.2996 0.2426 1.0000      
Q22 0.1715 0.1481 0.4518 1.0000     
Q23 0.2009 0.1965 0.4643 0.7044 1.0000    
Q24 0.2626 0.3993 0.3038 0.5416 0.6131 1.0000   
Q25 0.3465 0.4543 0.1347 0.2077 0.3157 0.3499 1.0000  
Q26 0.2362 0.5638 0.2264 0.1310 0.1729 0.2717 0.4644 1.0000 
 
Table 17:  Final Survey Correlation Matrix for Questions Supporting Trust Construct 
 
 Table 18 displays the results of several correlative measures between items 
supporting the IS environmental factor called trust.  The “Corrected Item-Total 
Correlation” column indicates how consistent items are with the scale to total.  Shannon 
et al (2001) argues that a minimum consistency measure of .5 is desirable.  
  
 Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
 Inter-Item 
Correlation 
Values 
 
Q19 0.3995 0.2289    
Q20 0.5078 0.4502  Max/Min: 1.2864 
Q21 0.4665 0.3244  Variance: 0.1108 
Q22 0.5350 0.5394    
Q23 0.6136 0.6089    
Q24 0.6226 0.4872    
Q25 0.4889 0.3592    
Q26 0.4369 0.3836    
      
  Alpha = 0.8000   
 
 
Table 18:  Final Survey ANOVA for Questions Supporting Trust Construct  
 
Four values in Table 18 fall below the minimum desired value:  Q19 at .3995, Q21 at 
.4665, Q25 at .4889, and Q26 at .4369.  The “Squared Multiple Correlation” column 
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indicates how much variance is accounted for in each item (Shannon et al, 2001).  Each 
item in Table 18 accounts for a considerable percentage of variance:  the lowest value 
occurs at Q19 at .2289.   
 The “Inter-Item Correlation Values” column compares the minimum and 
maximum r values from the correlation matrix, which helps to determine inter-item 
consistency.  A ratio of 1:1 is desirable with a variance as close to 0 as possible (Shannon 
et al, 2001).  Table 18 indicates a Max/Min ratio of 1.2864 with a variance of .1108.  The 
overall coefficient alpha is .8000, which exceeds the minimum desired coefficient alpha 
of .7 (Hair et al, 1995; Nunnally, 1978).  These values simply mean that survey items 19-
26 adequately correlate to represent the trust construct. 
 Results. 
 The following sections present the results of the survey and comparisons of the 
sample based on years of service and membership in professional organizations as they 
pertain to each research question.   
  Research Questions 1 & 2: Frequency of Use and Perceived Usefulness. 
 This section presents results which help to answer research questions #1 and #2.  
Research question #1 asked the extent to which existing federal criminal justice 
information systems are used by state and local departments.  Research question #2 asked 
about user perceptions regarding the usefulness of federal criminal justice information 
systems in accomplishing LE missions at the state and local levels.  The first two survey 
questions were specifically geared to answer these research questions.  These survey 
items asked respondents to rate how frequently they accessed 22 federal criminal justice 
information systems and then rate how useful those systems were toward accomplishing 
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LE missions.  Both questions relied on a five-point Likert scale on which participants 
rated frequency of use from “never” (1) to “constantly” (5) and rated usefulness from 
“not useful at all” (1) to “extremely useful” (5).  The results of these questions are 
presented in Table 19. 
System Freq 
Mean 
Freq Std. 
Dev. 
Use 
Mean 
Use Std. 
Dev. 
Combined 
Score 
Kendall's 
Tau 
NCIC Net 4.280 0.984 4.340 0.808 18.575 45.391 
NLETS 2.610 1.576 2.840 1.487 7.412 44.279 
UCR/NIBRS 2.410 1.718 2.280 1.360 5.495 48.601 
NICS 2.250 1.353 2.370 1.240 5.333 43.761 
LE websites 2.110 0.816 2.130 1.040 4.494 40.250 
IAFIS 1.750 1.212 2.040 1.544 3.570 19.943 
III 1.630 1.325 1.740 1.456 2.836 12.842 
LEO 1.280 0.797 1.420 1.109 1.818 8.451 
CODIS 1.140 0.459 1.260 0.844 1.436 6.808 
CJIS WAN 1.070 0.264 1.140 0.500 1.220 5.735 
NDPIX 1.100 0.379 1.090 0.383 1.199 5.285 
RISS 1.050 0.299 1.120 0.603 1.176 3.974 
IDENT-INS 1.040 0.221 1.090 0.489 1.134 3.642 
NIBIN 1.060 0.245 1.060 0.229 1.124 4.888 
JABS 1.040 0.251 1.060 0.494 1.102 2.516 
FinCen 1.050 0.224 1.040 0.187 1.092 3.640 
OLES 1.040 0.255 1.040 0.261 1.082 3.301 
AGILE 1.000 0.000 1.070 0.448 1.070 0.000 
CWIN 1.030 0.234 1.030 0.240 1.061 2.284 
GCJIN 1.020 0.157 1.030 0.311 1.051 2.034 
PSWN 1.020 0.138 1.020 0.148 1.040 2.726 
NIPC 1.010 0.091 1.020 0.229 1.030 1.754 
 
Table 19:  Federal Criminal Justice Information Systems Ranked by  
Combined Score (Frequency of Use x Perceived Usefulness) 
 
 The means of the results for each question are presented in the second and fourth 
columns.  “Frequency Mean” presents the overall mean for responses to Q1, which asked 
respondents to record how frequently they used each system.  “Usefulness Mean” 
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presents the overall mean for responses to Q2, which asked respondents to record how 
useful they perceived the system was toward accomplishing LE missions. 
 Table 19 also shows the 22 systems in a ranked order.  The systems were ranked 
by analyzing means of frequency of use/perceived usefulness characteristics.  The 22 
systems studied in this research for frequency of use and perceived usefulness were 
ranked by a combined frequency of use/perceived usefulness score.  The combined score 
was calculated by multiplying the mean frequency of use for each system by the 
corresponding mean perceived usefulness.  Higher means indicated a greater frequency of 
use and higher degree of usefulness; therefore, systems were ranked based on the mean 
scores of these two characteristics.  The combined frequency of use/perceived usefulness 
score is shown in the sixth column, labeled “combined score.”   
As the table shows, National Crime Information Center Network (NCIC Net) 
outscored all other systems by a wide margin.  Rounding out the top five, in order, were 
the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS), Uniform Crime 
Reporting/National Incident-Based Reporting System (UCR/NIBRS), National Instant 
Criminal Background Check System (NICS), and federal LE websites.  The bottom five 
systems included Cyber Warning Information Network (CWIN), Global Criminal Justice 
Information Network (GCJIN), Advanced Generation for Interoperability in Law 
Enforcement (AGILE), Public Safety Wireless Network (PSWN), and National 
Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC). 
The previous method, however, does not take into account the standard deviation 
of responses.  Therefore, systems were also ranked via Kendall’s tau.  Kendall’s tau is a 
nonparametric measure of association.  Its value indicates the strength of a relationship 
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with larger values indicating stronger relationships (Shannon et al, 2001).  “Kendall's tau 
is used when all variables involved are ordinal, which means they have direction or order, 
such as age or education” (Smith, 2001).  Table 20 shows combined score and Kendall’s 
tau ranking values for each of the 22 systems. 
System Combined 
Score Rank 
Kendall's 
Tau Rank 
NCIC Net 1 2 
NLETS 2 3 
UCR/NIBRS 3 1 
NICS 4 4 
LE websites 5 5 
IAFIS 6 6 
III 7 7 
LEO 8 8 
CODIS 9 9 
CJIS WAN 10 10 
NDPIX 11 11 
RISS 12 13 
IDENT-INS 13 14 
NIBIN 14 12 
JABS 15 18 
FinCen 16 15 
OLES 17 16 
AGILE 18 22 
CWIN 19 19 
GCJIN 20 20 
PSWN 21 17 
NIPC 22 21 
 
Table 20:  Federal CJIS Rank Comparison (Combined Score vs. Kendall’s Tau) 
 
 As shown by Table 20, the combined score and Kendall’s tau rankings do not 
completely agree, primarily because Kendall’s tau takes standard deviation into account 
and the combined score does not.  The differences between ranking systems are minor.  
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The high and low scoring information systems do not change using either ranking system, 
though the exact order of these two groups of systems would change between ranking 
methods.  In total, either ranking method is statistically sound and produces valid ranking 
results; however, this research used the combined scores as the primary ranking scheme.   
Comparisons of Sample Population Subsets. 
 Demographics were collected in order to compare responses between subsets of 
the sample population to determine if responses to survey items pertaining to each 
research question differed significantly.  This section presents the results of those 
comparisons of segments of the sample population with respect to research questions #1 
and #2.  These comparisons do not contribute to directly answering the research 
questions, but merely demonstrate differences or similarities in responses between 
subsets of the sample population.  Two demographics were collected specifically to study 
whether segments of the sample population differed significantly.  These demographics 
include years of service and membership in particular professional organizations. 
    Comparison Based on Years of Service. 
The average years of service among respondents in the sample population was 
nine years and eight months.  Of the total responses, 161 respondents fell above and 211 
fell below the average.  This section will examine whether there is a significant 
difference in the responses of respondents who fell above and respondents who fell below 
the average years of experience. 
This comparison was made using a z statistic which compares the means of two 
sample populations.  Since both subsets of the population are relatively large (over 30), 
the Central Limit Theorem can be invoked.  At a = .05, za = 1.645.  Therefore, in 
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comparing the sample populations, any z statistic greater than 1.645 indicates a 
statistically significant difference in responses from subsets of the population differing in 
years of service.  Tables 21 and 22 show the results of independent sampling tests of 
these subsets of the sample population.  Bolded values indicate a z statistic greater than 
the 1.645 threshold. 
   
  Total 
Response 
Mean 
High 
Service 
Time 
Mean 
Low 
Service 
Time 
Mean 
z statistic 
AGILE 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.000 
PSWN 1.02 1.03 1.01 1.285 
OLES 1.04 1.05 1.04 0.361 
GCJIN 1.02 1.01 1.02 0.640 
RISS 1.05 1.01 1.08 2.537 
JABS 1.04 1.03 1.04 0.376 
INDENT 1.04 1.06 1.02 1.547 
NIPC 1.01 1.02 1.00 1.750 
UCR/NIBRS 2.41 2.59 2.29 1.627 
LEO 1.28 1.23 1.31 0.970 
NICS 2.11 2.19 2.05 0.961 
NIBIN 1.06 1.05 1.08 1.189 
CODIS 1.14 1.19 1.11 1.579 
IAFIS 1.75 1.71 1.79 0.625 
III 1.63 1.61 1.64 0.210 
CJIS WAN 1.07 1.07 1.08 0.360 
NCIC Net 4.28 4.32 4.24 0.775 
FinCEN 1.05 1.06 1.05 0.410 
NLETS 2.61 2.52 2.67 0.892 
NDPIX 1.10 1.10 1.10 0.000 
CWIN 1.03 1.03 1.03 0.000 
LE websites 2.25 2.21 2.27 0.700 
    za=1.645 
 
Table 21:  High/Low Service Time Mean Test Results for Q1 
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 Total 
Responses 
Mean 
High 
Service 
Time 
Mean 
Low 
Service 
Time 
Mean 
z statistic 
AGILE 1.07 1.05 1.09 0.893 
PSWN 1.02 1.03 1.02 0.615 
OLES 1.04 1.03 1.05 0.753 
GCJIN 1.03 1.01 1.05 1.405 
RISS 1.12 1.03 1.19 2.825 
JABS 1.06 1.05 1.07 0.386 
INDENT 1.09 1.12 1.07 0.912 
NIPC 1.02 1.04 1.00 1.400 
UCR/NIBRS 2.28 2.40 2.19 1.444 
LEO 1.42 1.36 1.46 0.860 
NICS 2.13 2.19 2.10 0.675 
NIBIN 1.06 1.04 1.07 1.272 
CODIS 1.26 1.34 1.21 1.409 
IAFIS 2.04 2.00 2.07 0.427 
III 1.74 1.69 1.78 0.578 
CJIS WAN 1.14 1.13 1.15 0.382 
NCIC Net 4.34 4.39 4.30 1.073 
FinCEN 1.04 1.04 1.03 0.492 
NLETS 2.84 2.77 2.90 0.811 
NDPIX 1.09 1.11 1.09 0.474 
CWIN 1.03 1.03 1.03 0.000 
LE websites 2.37 2.50 2.28 2.002 
    za=1.645 
 
Table 22:  High/Low Service Time Mean Test Results for Q2 
  
As the tables show, the responses from these subsets of the sample population did 
not differ significantly, as only four of the 44 items differed at a statistically significant 
level.  Based on this, regardless of service time, participants responded similarly to 
survey items in Q1 and Q2. 
    Comparison Based on Professional Organization. 
Most respondents to this survey belonged to the Fraternal Order of Police:  340 
out of 360 total responses.  Sixteen of the remaining respondents belonged to the 
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International Association of Chiefs of Police.  This section will examine whether there 
are significant differences in responses of FOP and IACP respondents. 
 Total 
Responses 
Mean 
FOP 
Mean 
IACP 
Mean 
t-value  
AGILE 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.000 
PSWN 1.02 1.01 1.25 216.647 
OLES 1.04 1.03 1.44 107.248 
GCJIN 1.02 1.01 1.31 217.947 
RISS 1.05 1.04 1.38 60.730 
JABS 1.04 1.01 1.50 140.091 
INDENT 1.04 1.04 1.00 12.387 
NIPC 1.01 1.01 1.00 18.549 
UCR/NIBRS 2.41 2.43 1.94 2.533 
LEO 1.28 1.26 1.75 11.854 
NICS 2.11 2.12 2.12 0.000 
NIBIN 1.06 1.06 1.13 17.658 
CODIS 1.14 1.14 1.13 0.556 
IAFIS 1.75 1.74 2.13 4.074 
III 1.63 1.61 1.94 2.871 
CJIS WAN 1.07 1.07 1.25 39.702 
NCIC Net 4.28 4.28 4.00 4.400 
FinCEN 1.05 1.04 1.31 86.595 
NLETS 2.61 2.59 2.94 2.160 
NDPIX 1.10 1.09 1.25 16.910 
CWIN 1.03 1.01 1.38 113.205 
LE websites 2.25 2.22 2.81 13.701 
    ta=1.649 
 
Table 23:  FOP/IACP Mean Test Results for Q1 
 
This comparison was made using a t test which compares the means of two 
sample populations.  The t test was used in this comparison because the IACP subset of 
the sample population contains only 16 entries.  Because this number does not exceed the 
threshold for invoking the CLT, the z statistic method used previously would not produce 
valid results.  However, the t test is designed to compare population means when the size 
of one or both of the subpopulations does not exceed the CLT threshold.  Tables 23 and 
24 show the results of t tests of these subsets of the sample population.   
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Total 
Responses 
Mean 
FOP 
Mean 
IACP 
Mean 
t-value  
AGILE 1.07 1.04 1.69 53.455 
PSWN 1.02 1.01 1.25 186.768 
OLES 1.04 1.03 1.38 83.915 
GCJIN 1.03 1.02 1.31 47.030 
RISS 1.12 1.10 1.56 19.559 
JABS 1.06 1.04 1.50 29.476 
INDENT 1.09 1.09 1.13 2.522 
NIPC 1.02 1.02 1.06 11.466 
UCR/NIBRS 2.28 2.29 1.94 2.890 
LEO 1.42 1.41 1.75 4.192 
NICS 2.13 2.15 1.94 2.079 
NIBIN 1.06 1.06 1.06 0.000 
CODIS 1.26 1.26 1.19 1.498 
IAFIS 2.04 2.03 2.37 2.173 
III 1.74 1.71 2.38 4.855 
CJIS WAN 1.14 1.13 1.50 22.861 
NCIC Net 4.34 4.36 3.88 11.308 
FinCEN 1.04 1.03 1.25 100.988 
NLETS 2.84 2.82 3.25 2.988 
NDPIX 1.09 1.09 1.31 22.949 
CWIN 1.03 1.01 1.44 130.132 
LE websites 2.37 2.36 2.50 1.969 
    ta =1.649 
 
Table 24:  FOP/IACP Mean Test Results for Q2 
 
At a = .05, ta = 1.649.  Therefore, in comparing the sample populations, any t 
value greater than 1.649 indicates a statistically significant difference in responses from 
subsets of the population differing in years of service.  Bolded values indicate a t value 
greater than the 1.649 threshold. 
The results indicated there were far more significant differences in the responses 
of subsets of the sample population broken out by professional organization than 
differences in responses of subsets of the sample population broken out by years of 
service.  Only five of the forty-four items on the survey did not differ at a statistically 
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significant level between these two subsets of the sample population.  Based on this 
information, participants who belonged to FOP responded to survey items in Q1 and Q2 
in a very different manner than participants who belonged to IACP. 
  Research Question 3: Access and Trust  Constructs. 
 The following sections present results which help to answer research question #3.  
Research question #3 asked about state and local LE “user” perceptions regarding the 
environmental factors that may affect criminal justice information system usage and 
information sharing between federal and state/local LE levels.  
   Access Construct.  
The next six survey questions (Q3-Q8) were designed to measure the IS 
environmental factor called access.   Respondents were asked to rate how much they 
agreed or disagreed with statements about their abilities to access information on federal 
criminal justice information systems.   
Each question relied on a five-point Likert scale on which participants rated their 
agreement with the statement from “completely disagree” (1) to “completely agree” (5).   
A comparison was made between the expected mean and the observed mean using a z 
statistic, which compares an observed mean with an expected mean.  The middle value of 
the Likert scale (3) was used as the expected mean.  Because the range of answers is 
discrete and not continuous, a z-statistic can be used only if it can be shown that the 
distribution of the z statistic possesses nearly the same shape as the theoretical t 
distribution for populations that are nonnormal—in other words, the probability 
distribution must be mound-shaped if not normally distributed.  This is especially true for 
Likert scale questions, since a Likert scale question with only 5 possible answers cannot 
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possibly possess a normal probability distribution.  Therefore, results of these z-tests can 
not be used for hard scientific proof, but indications of trends in the data (Shannon et al, 
2001).  A frequency analysis of the results showed that the probability distribution is, in 
fact, mound-shaped.  Table 25 shows an example of a frequency analysis on Q3.  As the 
figure shows, responses to this question were mound-shaped.  All other survey items 
showed similar results.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 25:  Frequency Analysis of Q3 
 
 
Since the population is relatively large (over 30), the Central Limit Theorem 
(CLT) can be invoked.  At a = .05, za = 1.645.  Therefore, in comparing the sample 
populations, any z statistic greater than 1.645 indicates a statistically significant 
difference in sample population responses from the expected mean.  Table 26, showing 
the results of the survey, also indicates the results of the independent sampling tests.  
Bolded values indicate a z statistic greater than the 1.645 threshold.    
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  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Z 
Statistic 
Q3 3.11 .994 1.345 
Q4 3.00 .975 0.136 
Q5 2.78 .889 3.271 
Q6 3.03 .952 0.412 
Q7 2.78 .833 3.215 
Q8 3.06 .950 0.824 
 
Table 26:  Results of Questions Supporting Access Construct 
 
Because the observed mean falls outside the expected probability distribut ion, a 
statistically high or low mean suggests the item is perceived to be a problem area for state 
and local LE personnel relating to access to federal criminal justice information systems.  
In other words, given a standard deviation of .889 for Q5 (or .833 for Q7), a mean of 2.78 
falls statistically significantly outside the expected mean range.  This means that the 
observed means for these items are statistically significantly lower than the expected 
mean, suggesting that these two access items are a concern for state and local LE 
personnel with respect to federal criminal justice information systems.  These items 
measured access to classified case-related information and whether federal agencies took 
state/local LE organization’s IT capabilities into account.  Since these observed means 
were statistically significantly lower than the expected means, the results indicate that 
state/local LE personnel perceive that they do not have adequate access to classified case-
related information and also perceive that federal LE agencies do not take their 
organization’s IT capabilities into account.   
   Trust Construct. 
            The final eight survey questions (Q19-Q26) were designed to measure the IS 
environmental factor called trust.   Respondents were asked to rate how much they agreed 
or disagreed with statements about how much they trust federal LE information sources.  
90 
Each question relied on a five-point Likert scale on which participants rated their 
agreement with the statement from “completely disagree” (1) to “completely agree” (5).  
The results of these questions are presented in Table 27.  The same z-test was conducted 
here as with Q3-8.   
  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Z 
Statistic 
Q19 3.06 .872 0.858 
Q20 2.93 .890 0.992 
Q21 3.52 .870 7.444 
Q22 3.66 .966 9.007 
Q23 3.59 .958 8.084 
Q24 3.33 1.050 4.318 
Q25 2.91 .846 1.304 
Q26 2.84 .800 2.371 
 
Table 27:  Results of Questions Supporting Trust Construct 
 
 Because the observed mean falls outside the expected probability distribution, a 
statistically high or low mean suggests the item is perceived to be a problem area for state 
and local LE personnel relating to trust in federal LE information sources.  The observed 
means for Q21, Q22, Q23, and Q24 are statistically significantly higher than the expected 
mean while Q26 is statistically significantly lower than the expected mean.  This suggests 
that these items supporting the trust construct are concerns for state and local LE 
personnel with respect to federal criminal justice information systems.  Q21 measured 
how much state/local LE personnel trust the information gained from federal sources.  
The statistically high observed mean for this question suggests that state/local LE 
personnel perceive information gained from federal sources to be trustworthy.  Q22-24 
measured how much state/local LE officials trust the capabilities of federal LE agencies 
to gather intelligence and react to emerging, critical threats within the U.S.  The 
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statistically high observed means for these questions suggest that state/local LE personnel 
perceive that federal LE agencies are adequately capable of gathering intelligence and 
reacting to emerging, critical threats within the U.S.  Q26 measured how responsive to 
feedback federal agencies were perceived to be by state/local LE personnel.  The 
statistically low observed mean for this question suggests that state/local LE personnel 
perceive federal LE agencies to be unresponsive to feedback from their organizations. 
Comparisons of Sample Population Subsets. 
 Demographics were collected in order to compare responses between subsets of 
the sample population to determine if responses to survey items pertaining to each 
research question differed significantly.  This section presents the results of those 
comparisons of segments of the sample population with respect to research question #3.  
These comparisons do not contribute to directly answering the research questions, but 
merely demonstrate differences or similarities in responses between subsets of the sample 
population.  Two demographics were collected specifically to study whether segments of 
the sample population differed significantly.  These demographics include years of 
service and membership in particular professional organizations. 
    Comparison Based on Years of Service. 
The average years of service among respondents in the sample population was 
nine years and eight months.  Of the total responses, 161 respondents fell above and 211 
fell below the average.  This section examines whether there is a significant difference in 
the responses of respondents who fell above from those who fell below that average.   
 This comparison was made using a z statistic which compares the means of two 
sample populations.  Since both subsets of the population are relatively large (over 30), 
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the Central Limit Theorem can be invoked.  At a = .05, za = 1.645.  Therefore, in 
comparing the sample populations, any z value greater than 1.645 indicates a statistically 
significant difference in responses from subsets of the population.  Table s 28 and 29 
show the results of independent sampling tests of these subsets of the sample population.  
Any bolded values indicate a z statistic greater than the 1.645 threshold.   
 Total 
Responses 
Mean 
High 
Service 
Time 
Mean 
Low 
Service 
Time 
Mean 
z statistic 
Q3 3.10 3.08 3.11 0.280 
Q4 2.99 2.92 3.05 1.233 
Q5 2.77 2.72 2.80 0.837 
Q6 3.03 3.09 2.98 1.065 
Q7 2.78 2.80 2.76 0.436 
Q8 3.06 3.07 3.04 0.285 
    za =1.645 
 
Table 28:  High/Low Service Time Mean Test Results for Q3-Q8 
 
 Total 
Responses 
Mean 
High 
Service 
Time 
Mean 
Low 
Service 
Time 
Mean 
z statistic 
Q19 3.06 2.99 3.10 1.157 
Q20 2.93 2.93 2.94 0.104 
Q21 3.52 3.43 3.59 1.737 
Q22 3.66 3.74 3.60 1.382 
Q23 3.59 3.67 3.53 1.401 
Q24 3.33 3.43 3.26 1.524 
Q25 2.91 2.89 2.93 0.425 
Q26 2.84 2.85 2.84 0.115 
    za =1.645 
 
Table 29:  High/Low Service Time Mean Test Results for Q19-Q26 
 
As the tables show, the responses from these subsets of the sample population did 
not differ significantly.  Only one of the fourteen items differed at a statistically 
93 
significant level between these two subsets of the sample population.  Based on this 
information, regardless of service time, participants responded to survey items in Q3-8 
and Q19-26 in a very similar manner. Therefore, responses to questions relating to the IS 
environmental factors (research question #3) did not differ significantly by service time.  
    Comparison Based on Professional Organization. 
Membership in particular professional organizations was also collected in the 
demographics.  Most of the respondents to this survey belonged to the Fraternal Order of 
Police (FOP):  340 out of 360 total responses.  Sixteen of the remaining respondents 
belonged to the International Association of Chiefs of Police.  This section will examine 
whether there are significant differences in responses of FOP and IACP respondents. 
This comparison was made using a t test which compares the means of two 
sample populations.  The t test was used in this comparison because the IACP subset of 
the sample population contains only 16 entries.  Because this number does not exceed the 
threshold for invoking the CLT, the z statistic method used previously would not produce 
valid results.  However, the t test is designed to compare population means when the size 
of one or both of the subpopulations does not exceed the CLT threshold.  At a = .05,      
ta = 1.649.  Therefore, in comparing the sample populations, any t value greater than 
1.649 indicates a statistically significant difference in responses from subsets of the 
population differing in years of service.  Tables 30 and 31 show the results of t tests of 
these subsets of the sample population.  Bolded values indicate a t value greater than the 
1.649 threshold. 
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 Total 
Responses 
Mean 
FOP Mean IACP 
Mean 
t-value  
Q3 3.10 3.12 2.94 2.824 
Q4 2.99 3.01 3.00 0.162 
Q5 2.77 2.76 2.94 3.543 
Q6 3.03 3.03 3.19 2.693 
Q7 2.78 2.78 2.75 0.667 
Q8 3.06 3.06 3.00 1.003 
    ta =1.649 
 
Table 30:  FOP/IACP Mean Test Results for Q3-Q8 
 
 Total 
Responses 
Mean 
FOP 
Mean 
IACP 
Mean 
t-value  
Q19 3.06 3.04 3.38 6.933 
Q20 2.93 2.93 3.13 3.876 
Q21 3.52 3.52 3.25 5.455 
Q22 3.66 3.65 3.63 0.326 
Q23 3.59 3.59 3.50 1.500 
Q24 3.33 3.34 3.13 2.943 
Q25 2.91 2.91 2.88 0.651 
Q26 2.84 2.84 3.00 3.860 
    ta =1.649 
 
Table 31:  FOP/IACP Mean Test Results for Q19-Q26 
 
The results indicated there were more significant differences in the responses of 
subsets of the sample population broken out by professional organization than differences 
in responses of subsets of the sample population broken out by years of service.  Eight of 
the fourteen items relating to IS environmental factors differed at a statistically 
significant level between these two subsets of the sample population.  Based on this 
information, participants who belonged to FOP responded to survey items in Q3-8 and 
Q19-26 in a different manner than participants who belonged to IACP for over half the 
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items.  Therefore, responses to questions relating to the IS environmental factors 
(research question #3) differed by membership in professional organization. 
Comparison of Sample Population Based on Response Method 
 Two different response formats were offered during this survey:  a web-based 
format and a mail-out version send only to CIOs of state bureaus of investigation.  Most 
of the participants in this survey responded via the web-based format:  360 out of 372 
total responses.  The six remaining participants were CIOs who responded via the mail-
out format.  This section will examine whether there are significant differences in 
responses based on the response format. 
This comparison was made using a t test which compares the means of two 
sample populations.  The t test was used in this comparison because the mail-out 
participant subset of the sample population contains only six entries.  Because this 
number does not exceed the threshold for invoking the CLT, the z statistic method used 
previously would not produce valid results.  However, the t test is designed to compare 
population means when the size of one or both of the subpopulations does not exceed the 
CLT threshold.   
At a = .05, ta = 1.649.  Therefore, in comparing the sample populations, any t 
value greater than 1.649 indicates a statistically significant difference in responses from 
subsets of the population differing in response format.  Tables 32-35 show the results of 
the independent sampling tests of these subsets of the sample population.  Bolded values 
indicate a t value greater than the 1.649 threshold. 
The results indicated there were significant differences in the responses of subsets 
of the sample population broken out response format.  Only seven of the fifty-eight items 
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on the survey did not differ at a statistically significant level between these two subsets of 
the sample population.  Based on this information, participants who responded via the 
mail-out format answered survey items in a very different manner than participants who 
responded via the web-based version.  
  
 
 Total 
Responses 
Mean 
Web-
based 
Response 
Mean 
Mail-out 
Response 
Mean 
t statistic 
AGILE 1.00 1.00 1.17 192.773 
PSWN 1.02 1.02 1.67 115.964 
OLES 1.04 1.04 1.00 3.681 
GCJIN 1.02 1.02 1.00 4.855 
RISS 1.05 1.05 2.75 44.524 
JABS 1.04 1.04 1.00 3.799 
IDENT 1.04 1.04 1.00 4.901 
NIPC 1.01 1.01 1.67 202.337 
UCR/NIBRS 2.41 2.41 2.75 1.347 
LEO 1.28 1.28 3.25 35.163 
NICS 2.11 2.11 3.58 9.220 
NIBIN 1.06 1.06 1.42 53.882 
CODIS 1.14 1.14 1.58 20.298 
IAFIS 1.75 1.75 3.33 12.053 
III 1.63 1.63 3.83 14.390 
CJIS WAN 1.07 1.07 3.67 196.807 
NCIC Net 4.28 4.28 4.75 5.771 
FinCEN 1.05 1.05 1.92 94.261 
NLETS 2.61 2.61 4.75 10.284 
NDPIX 1.10 1.10 2.25 66.250 
CWIN 1.03 1.03 1.33 52.651 
LE websites 2.25 2.25 3.25 17.210 
    ta=1.649 
 
Table 32:  Web-Based vs. Mail-out Response Mean Test Results for Q1 
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 Total 
Response
s Mean 
Web-
based 
Response 
Mean 
Mail-out 
Response 
Mean 
t statistic 
AGILE 1.07 1.07 1.25 9.596 
PSWN 1.02 1.02 1.83 123.378 
OLES 1.04 1.04 1.17 19.775 
GCJIN 1.03 1.03 1.00 1.856 
RISS 1.12 1.12 2.92 48.202 
JABS 1.06 1.06 1.00 1.471 
IDENT 1.09 1.09 1.17 3.835 
NIPC 1.02 1.02 1.83 112.625 
UCR/NIBRS 2.28 2.28 2.58 1.903 
LEO 1.42 1.42 3.25 17.311 
NICS 2.13 2.13 3.58 10.744 
NIBIN 1.06 1.06 1.50 62.583 
CODIS 1.26 1.26 1.58 5.070 
IAFIS 2.04 2.04 3.25 5.874 
III 1.74 1.74 3.92 11.935 
CJIS WAN 1.14 1.14 3.58 86.128 
NCIC Net 4.34 4.34 4.75 7.442 
FinCEN 1.04 1.04 2.75 160.030 
NLETS 2.84 2.84 4.42 8.388 
NDPIX 1.09 1.09 2.17 60.142 
CWIN 1.03 1.03 1.67 40.423 
LE websites 2.37 2.37 3.17 8.585 
    ta =1.649 
 
Table 33:  Web-Based vs. Mail-out Response Mean Test Results for Q2 
 
It is important to take into consideration that there may be more than one variable 
affecting the differences in responses between those who responded via the mail-out 
version and those who responded via the web-based version.  Recall from Chapter 3 that 
the portion of the sample population that received the mail-out version of the survey were 
the CIOs of state bureaus of investigation, a portion of the total LE population 
specifically attuned to CJIS issues; whereas, the portion of the sample population 
receiving the web-based version of the survey were not specifically IS professionals—
rather, those who received the web-based version were general users of federal criminal 
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justice information systems.  This variable could account for some of the variation in 
responses between these two subsets of the sample population; however, it’s difficult, if 
not impossible, to measure how much of the total variation is accounted for by this 
variable and how much of the total variation is accounted for due to differences in 
responses influenced by the mail-out format versus the web-based format.  Therefore, the 
results of this comparison are influenced by more than one particular variable:  the 
difference between survey formats and inferences based on these statistics can not be 
completely reliable. 
 Total 
Responses 
Mean 
Web-base 
Response 
Mean 
Mail-Out 
Response 
Mean 
t statistic 
Q3 3.10 3.10 3.75 7.761 
Q4 2.99 2.99 3.08 1.095 
Q5 2.77 2.77 2.83 0.865 
Q6 3.03 3.03 2.92 1.398 
Q7 2.78 2.78 2.75 0.498 
Q8 3.06 3.06 3.42 4.604 
    ta =1.649 
 
Table 34:  Web-Based vs. Mail-out Response Mean Test Results for Q3-8 
 
 Total 
Responses 
Mean 
Web-
based 
Response 
Mean 
Mail-out 
Response 
Mean 
t statistic 
Q19 3.06 3.06 2.92 2.131 
Q20 2.93 2.93 3.00 1.021 
Q21 3.52 3.52 3.75 3.579 
Q22 3.66 3.66 3.25 5.097 
Q23 3.59 3.59 3.25 4.295 
Q24 3.33 3.33 3.08 2.679 
Q25 2.91 2.91 3.25 5.589 
Q26 2.84 2.84 3.00 2.863 
    ta =1.649 
 
Table 35:  Web-Based vs. Mail-out Response Mean Test Results for Q19-26 
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Summary 
 This chapter presented the findings and analysis for this research.  The response 
rate to the survey instrument was discussed.  Next, the demographics collected at the 
beginning of the survey instrument were analyzed to describe characteristics of the 
sample population.  The results of the survey were then presented, highlighting 
statistically significant deviations from the expected mean.  Finally, a comparative 
analysis of two subsets of the sample population was presented to determine if responses 
from these subsets differed significantly.  The next chapter presents the conclusions 
obtained from the results of this research. 
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V. Conclusions 
 
Introduction 
 This final chapter reviews conclusions about the findings in the previous chapter 
including additional findings of the research, management implications based on the 
results presented in this research, limitations of this research effort, and suggestions for 
future research in this area.   
Conclusions  
 NCIC Net, NLETS, UCR/NIBRS, NICS, LE websites, and IAFIS scored high on 
the frequency of use/perceived usefulness scale.  This suggests that state/local LE 
personnel utilize these systems on a fairly regular basis and perceive the systems to be 
useful toward accomplishing LE missions.  The bottom five systems, including CWIN, 
GCJIN, AGILE, PSWN, and NIPC, scored poorly on the combined scale.  This would 
indicate that these systems are not used very much at all at the state and local levels 
and/or their information is perceived to provide little value to the accomplishment of LE 
missions.   
 Of the four IS environmental factors studied in this research, all were deemed to 
be influential in some way.  Of the six items under the IS environmental factor called 
access, two items were identified as statistically significant toward detracting state/local 
LE personnel from utilizing federal criminal justice information systems.  The 
inaccessibility of classified information to complete LE missions was identified as a 
major detractor for state/local LE personnel.  Additionally, state/local LE officials 
perceive that federal agencies do not adequately take their department’s capabilities into 
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account when fielding criminal justice information systems, a factor that significantly 
influences whether state/local LE personnel will use or be able to use the system. 
 Finally, four of the eight items under the IS environmental factor called trust were 
ascertained to be statistically significant.  In general, respondents indicated a high degree 
of trust in federal LE agencies to gather effective intelligence about emerging threats and 
to react to those identified threats.  Respondents also specified a high degree of trust in 
the information received from federal LE agencies.  Q21 asked respondents to rate how 
much they trust information received from federal LE agencies.  Q22 asked respondents 
to rate how much they trusted federal LE capabilities to gather effective intelligence 
about emerging threats.  Q23 asked respondents to rate how much they trusted federal LE 
capabilities to react to emerging, critical situations.  Each question scored significantly 
higher than other items in this section.  Based on these results, it could be inferred there is 
a high degree of trust among state/local LE personnel in federal LE agencies to carry out 
LE missions.  These indications of high trust were mitigated by a strong suggestion that 
federal LE agencies are unreceptive to feedback from state and local LE agencies.  Q26 
asked respondents to rate how responsive federal LE agencies were to feedback from 
their departments.  Since this statistic was significantly lower than the expected mean, it 
could be inferred that state/local LE personnel perceive federal LE agencies as indifferent 
toward feedback from the state/local tiers of the LE community. 
Management Implications  
 In reaction to shocking events such as the Columbine High School shooting, 
terrorist attacks of 9/11, and the D.C. sniper shootings, federal LE agencies are sharing 
information on an unprecedented scale.  Two important realizations may be positively 
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impacting the amount of access federal LE agencies grant to state and local LE personnel.  
One of these realizations is that information is an extremely valuable weapon in 
combating crime.  New capabilities such as DNA testing and forensic entomology show 
just how powerful a little information in the hands of the criminologist can be toward 
identifying a perpetrator and proving that perpetrator’s guilt beyond a shadow of a doubt.  
The second realization centers on how much federal LE agencies rely on state/local 
personnel to complete LE missions.  A poignant example of this reliance is how much the 
INS relies on state/local LE personnel to identify illegal aliens.  Given the small number 
of INS agents in each state, it’s more likely that a state or local LE official will encounter 
the illegal alien before the INS does.  Obviously, it would be advantageous for the INS to 
cooperate with state/local LE agencies.  However, to take advantage of this reliance, the 
INS must first share information about the identities of known illegal aliens.   
 Despite the number of references in the literature review suggesting that 
information technology in the federal LE sector is obsolete, respondents to the survey did 
not identify technology as a significant issue (Q10).  While information technology at the 
federal level may indeed be behind current capabilities, the level of technology at the 
state and local levels is equally poor.  Thus, the obsolescence of information technology 
has gone relatively unnoticed, from a mission-capability perspective.  For instance, the 
majority of police work is done in the field.  Forensics are collected at the crime scene 
and examined in the lab.  Patrol officers spend much of their duty day in a vehicle, not 
behind a desk.  Quite frankly, the reliance on information technology that has been 
evident in other fields may not have permeated the LE community quite yet.  If this is so, 
the obsolescence of information technology in the federal sector would be a minor issue.  
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This perspective may be supported by the results of Q12 (which correlated well with Q10 
in the factor analysis), where respondents indicated a stronger reliance on interpersonal 
contact with federal LE agencies over electronic systems. 
Recommendations  
 As stated at the beginning of this thesis, the federal government expends a great 
deal of money on networks; however, little planning has been given to whether these 
expensive systems will be able to exchange information with other related, federally 
developed systems.  Compounding that situation, even less thought has been given as to 
how these systems will communicate with state and locally run LE information systems, 
where the information may be required to carry out public safety missions. 
 The increasing complexity of public safety threats has compounded the need for 
criminal justice information at all levels of the LE community.  Consequently, federal LE 
agencies should continue to develop information-sharing tools and encourage an open 
information-sharing culture in order to distribute vital criminal justice information and 
support public safety missions at the state and local levels.   
Additionally, shrinking budgets at all levels of government have made resource 
allocation a primary issue.  Based on information presented in the research, government 
organizations feel an increasing need for interdependency among other agencies (Prout, 
2002; Mueller, June 2002; Canterbury, 2002).  The FBI, INS, Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) and other federal law enforcement agencies continue to rely on 
each other to cover the myriad of law enforcement challenges facing the US.  Many of 
these challenges cross organizational boundaries:  border control, drug interdiction, and 
intelligence gathering, among others.  Federal agencies are seeking to reduce duplication 
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of effort in order to conserve resources and make the most of capabilities.  This effort is 
slowly bringing to light a greater dependence on collaborative efforts with state and local 
agencies to improve mission effectiveness (Public Safety Wireless Networks, 2002; 
AGILE, 2002).  Enabling collaborative efforts with state and local agencie s implies that 
enhanced access to federal information systems will eventually need to be granted to state 
and local agencies.  Likewise, information systems developed at the state and local levels 
should be capable of communicating with federal information systems. 
The prevailing attitudes toward sharing information may be changing in the 
federal tier of the LE community.  As the D.C. sniper case demonstrated, federal LE 
agencies are willing to consider sharing vital information with state/local LE 
organizations in dire situations.  However, information sharing continues to be a problem 
for the LE community on the whole.  Open information sharing practices should be 
adopted outside of large-scale incidents such as the Columbine High School shooting, 
Murrah Federal Building bombing, and 9/11 terrorist attacks with the goal of detecting 
and, consequently, preventing further tragedies through collaborative LE operations and 
intelligence analysis.  Success in this arena depends on the ability to share information 
among agencies that may reasonably play a part in detecting and/or preventing the 
situation.   
As with the III program, interoperability must be planned into the development of 
information-sharing tools.  Interoperability must also be introduced into contingency 
plans—developed cooperatively among the three tiers of government.  This implies a 
shift away from the territorial mindset that exists today toward a more collaborative 
environment where personnel, equipment, information, and other resources are more 
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openly shared between federal, state, and local law enforcement organizations that share 
a similar goal:  the protection of the people. 
Limitations of Research 
 Every research effort has its limitations.  The following limitations of this 
research effort are noted.  As noted in Chapter 3, self-selection of survey respondents to 
complete the survey introduces some bias into the results.  An additional limitation was 
the non-probability aspect of the sampling methodology.  While the survey did not 
randomly select participants, the distribution methodology described in Chapter 3 was 
intended to minimize any systematic effect introduced by the sampling method.  While 
this may not be optimal, the survey methodology was deemed valid, given the 
permission-based constraints of gaining full distribution—or any distribution, for that 
matter.  These factors do not invalidate the findings of this research, however, may 
constrain the generalizability of the results to the entire LE population (GVU, 1994).  
One final limitation with the distribution of the survey was the method of distribution.  
The researcher relied on POCs within the LE professional organizations to distribute the 
survey via email.  These POCs reported that they distributed the survey as agreed upon, 
and the researcher held great confidence that this had been accomplished; however, it 
cannot be conclusively demonstrated that all the POCs distributed the survey as planned.  
 The survey design introduced some limitations as well.  As noted in Chapter 3, 
the mixed methodology for the survey’s distribution provides limitations as well.  Using a 
mixed method approach has been shown to influence research results.  Several studies 
have found that response rates for web-based surveys tend to be lower than mail-out 
surveys (Manfreda et al, 2001; Gonier, 1999; Kwak et al, 1999).  Manfreda et al cite “low 
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preference for the web mode” (2001) as a possible contributing factor.  Countering this 
limitation is the fact that such a small portion of our population will receive the mailed 
survey (50 out of 15,000).  Additionally, studies have indicated that there may be 
statistically significant substantive and data quality differences (e.g. non-response rates 
for closed ended questions) between the two methods that may impact research results 
(Manfreda et al, 2001; Gonier, 1999).  A comparison was conducted between responses 
from the mail-out format versus responses from the web-based version, and the responses 
were found to be statistically significantly different.  However, it is important to consider 
that more than one variable influenced the differences in responses.  Not only were 
responses recorded from different formats, but each format was distributed to 
dynamically different subsets of the total population:  the mail-out version went to LE 
CJIS professionals while the web-based version was sent to general LE users of federal 
CJIS.  This additional variable could account for a significant portion of the variance in 
responses; however, the exact amounts of variance accounted for by each variable are 
difficult, if not impossible to measure.   
 Additionally, pilot test reliability results showed that survey items supporting the 
system quality and information quality constructs did not correlate well.  This problem 
was not addressed before the final implementation of the survey instrument, resulting in 
coefficient alphas that did not meet the minimum standard of .7 to provide statistically 
reliable conclusions about these constructs. Consequently, the system quality and 
information quality constructs were discarded from the final analysis. 
 The researcher introduced another limitation associated with the pilot test.  
Though reliability test results clearly indicated aforementioned problems with the 
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systems quality and information quality constructs, the researcher did not correct these 
problems prior to the survey’s final application.  As mentioned in Chapter 4, this 
oversight in the survey’s application was due to time constraints and lack of experience 
of the researcher. 
 One final limitation involved the collection of demographics.  When constructing 
the question collecting primary duty description, five choices were given to survey 
participants:  patrol, investigator, supervisor, administrator, and other.  It was expected 
that the number of respondents choosing “other” would be relatively low compared to the 
other responses; however, the number of participants choosing “other” nearly equaled the 
numbers of participants who chose “investigator” or “supervisor.”  This increased the 
influence of “other” respondents in the survey results and introduced a question about 
who fell into the “other” category.  Because respondents who chose the “other” option 
were not asked to provide an alternate duty description, the nature of these respondents 
could not be ascertained.  Along these lines, it is unknown how the four respondents who 
answered neither for the professional organization demographic received the survey, 
since the survey was distributed through professional organization representatives and the 
CIOs were not asked to provide their professional organization.  This may suggest that 
email recipients forwarded the survey to friends or coworkers, which would change the 
sample size of the population.  Unfortunately, this irregularity cannot be resolved and so 
remains a limitation of the research methodology.  
Suggestions for Future Research  
 The following paragraphs discuss prospective future research topics relating to 
this thesis project.  These topics include interoperability in the federal LE community, 
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information-sharing between LEAs and the private sector, identifying and protecting U.S. 
critical infrastructure, and interoperability between departments of the federal 
government.     
 Longitudinal Study 
 The LE community is expected to change in many respects as the terrorism and 
other complex public safety threats continue to evolve.  Repeating this study at a later 
date could reveal how these events are shaping communication in the LE community. 
 Technology Independence in the LE Community 
 Though system quality could not be conclusively studied, one of the four items 
under the IS environmental factor called system quality was determined to be statistically 
significant.  State and local LE personnel reported a definitive preference to interpersonal 
contact over electronic systems when communicating with federal LE agencies.  During 
factor analysis, this item correlated highly with the item studying attitudes about the 
obsolescence of federal LE information technology.  If the items are connected, this 
could point to a technology- independent attitude in the LE community—a subject area 
that might require further study. 
 Federal Law Enforcement IS Interoperability   
While this paper discussed the communications and information-sharing 
capabilities of federal law enforcement agencies with state and local law enforcement 
organizations, many articles suggested there would be value in studying how federal law 
enforcement agencies communicate and share information resources among themselves.  
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 Information-Sharing Between LEAs and the Private Sector   
Many of the articles reviewed during this research discussed collaborative efforts 
between law enforcement agencies and industry.  Financial crime investigations involve 
both the Treasury Department’s law enforcement personnel and private banking/trading 
institutions (FINCEN, 2002).  In February 2002, the new administration for homeland 
security held a conference involving federal agencies, military commanders, state/local 
law enforcement associations, non-profit organizations, and private industry leaders to 
discuss major issues concerning domestic U.S. defense.  An entire session was dedicated 
to examining how the public and private sectors can work together to combat terrorism.   
 Critical IT Infrastructure   
Critical infrastructure throughout the U.S. includes capabilities relating to 
banking, power production, drinking water availability, transportation structures, and 
telecommunications.  Facilities that support infrastructure include nuc lear power plants, 
dams, railroads, highways, water purification and sewage treatment plants, phone and 
electric lines, and fiber optic cable.  As noted in the Homeland Security Conference 
Report, the federal government has so far failed to “establish an effective mechanism for 
determining which of the country’s vast infrastructure are vital to national security 
missions and economic activity…” (Homeland Security Monitor, 2002).  The absence of 
a critical infrastructure protection (CIP) plan remains a blatant hole in national strategy 
and the “weak link in the national homeland security posture….failure to define critical 
infrastructure could result in a disproportionate allocation of resources” (Homeland 
Security Monitor, 2002).  A study that assesses U.S. criminal justice IT infrastructure 
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toward developing a CIP for the LE community would be one viable research route in 
this area.     
   Federal Department IS Interoperability   
Though each department in the federal government covers a substantially 
different set of legislative responsibilities, collaborative efforts between these different 
departments could yield significant gains in bureaucratic productivity.  For example, the 
INS deports only 112,000 of the 275,000 illegal aliens who enter the US each year (Prout, 
2001).  How could information sharing initiatives with the Department of the Interior or 
Department of Agriculture help the INS identify and apprehend fugitives? Major 
computer viruses attack federal networks each year.  How could a collaborative network 
provide essential cyber-threat information to all federal agencies to prevent the spread of 
and minimize the damage done by malicious programs?  Again, there are a substantial 
number of avenues a researcher could take in this area. 
Summary 
 This chapter elaborated on conclusions about the results of the survey presented in 
the previous chapter.  The implications of these conclusions for the federal LE 
community were then presented.  Additionally, the limitations of this research effort were 
discussed, and suggestions for future research in this area were presented in hopes that 
succeeding researchers will continue to advance our knowledge of the nature of 
communication in the LE community.   
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Appendix A. 
Federal Law Enforcement Agency Descriptions 
 
 
 Brief descriptions of nine prominent federal agencies and website information on 
14 other federal law enforcement agencies are provided below.   
Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) 
 AFOSI was created in 1948 under the Department of the Air Force.  It is the 
primary investigations office for major criminal activities within AF.  According to the 
AFOSI website, “the organization seeks to identify, investigate, and neutralize espionage, 
terrorism, fraud and other major criminal activities that may threaten AF and DoD 
resources.”  (AFOSI, 2002)  AFOSI’s four main focus areas include counterintelligence, 
violent crime, cyber threats, and acquisition fraud.  The agency consists of 2,274 active 
duty personnel, of which 1,672 are special agents.   
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) 
 In 1789, the first Congress imposed a tax on imported spirits in order to pay some 
of the new nation’s Revolutionary War debt.  The Department of the Treasury assumed 
these duties under the Office of Internal Revenue, later the IRS.  In 1972, these duties 
were transferred to a separate, newly created bureau—the ATF—under Treasury 
Department Order No. 120-1.  The ATF’s initial authority included all matters related to 
alcohol, tobacco, firearms, and explosives; however, these duties were expanded to 
include arson investigations when arson was deemed by Congress to be a federal crime 
by the Anti-Arson Act of 1982.  According to the ATF website, “charged as it were with 
fiscal oversight of some of the most controversial topics in Western civilization, ATF 
strives to maintain professional neutrality while giving a 35-to-1 return on every dollar it 
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spends” and collects over $13B revenue annually. (ATF, 2002)  This view aligns with the 
ATF’s mission:  “a law enforcement agency…with unique responsibilities dedicated to 
reducing violent crime, collecting revenue, and protecting the people.”  (ATF, 2002)  
Among the bureau’s activities, ATF personnel license and regulate 9,500 explosives 
industry members, regulate 104,000 federal firearms licensees to ensure compliance with 
federal firearms laws, administer the Firearms Trafficking Program, staff the National 
Tracing Center which tracked approximately 200,000 crime guns in FY99, investigate 
illegal alcohol and tobacco diversion cases, and review 74,000 alcohol labels to ensure 
proper classification and product disclosure.  In addition, the ATF provides gang-
resistance education programs to schools and trains canines to detect explosives, spent 
cartridges, and fire accelerants.  (ATF, 2002) 
United States Coast Guard (USCG) 
 The Revenue Cutter Service was created by Congress in 1790 to protect the 
nation’s ports and enforce customs directives on incoming trade.  In 1915, the Revenue 
Cutter Service merged with the Life-Saving Service to create the USCG.  The USCG 
operates within the Department of the Treasury during peacetime; however, authority 
falls to the Secretary of the Navy during war or when the President directs.  In addition to 
the USCG’s national defense mission, the organization is “charged with a broad scope of 
regulatory, law enforcement, humanitarian, and emergency response duties.”  (USCG, 
2002)  The USCG has five strategic objectives:  maritime safety which includes search 
and rescue, marine safety, recreational boating safety, and international ice patrol; 
maritime mobility which includes navigation aids, icebreaking services, bridge 
administration, vessel traffic, and waterways management; maritime security which 
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includes drug interdiction, alien migrant interdiction, living marine resource 
management, and law/treaty enforcement; national defense which includes general 
defense duties, homeland defense, port and waterways security, and polar icebreaking; 
and protection of natural resources which includes foreign vessel inspections, living 
marine resources protection, marine and environmental science, and marine pollution 
education, prevention, response, and enforcement.  (USCG, 2002)  The USCG is 
responsible for 95,000 miles of US coastlines and 3.4 million square miles of ocean 
defining the US Exclusive Economic Zones.  (USCG, 2002) 
United States Customs Service 
 The Customs Service is a branch of the US Treasury and acts as the primary law 
enforcement agency protecting US borders.  The Tariff Act of 1789 authorized the US 
government to collect revenue from imported goods and led to the establishment of the 
Customs Service later that year.  (US Customs, 2002)  Customs officials clear 
international travelers into the US, examine baggage, control imports, and provide 
smuggler/alien interdiction services.  As a result of their revenue collection duties, 
Customs returns approximately $22B annually to the US Treasury with a 16-to-1 return 
ration for every dollar appropriated.  Customs provides the nation’s second largest source 
of revenue (second only to IRS tax collection revenues).  Customs revenues paid for the 
territories of Louisiana, Oregon, Florida, and Alaska and funded construction of the City 
of Washington and important infrastructure such as the National Road, the 
Transcontinental Railroad, and all of the nation’s lighthouses.  More recently, the 
Customs Service has been directed to research methods to help automate commercial 
import processes, which is expected to streamline import procedures, lower the cost of 
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trade compliance, and decrease the amount of paperwork associated with importation.  
(US Customs, 2002)  In addition to protecting US borders, Customs officials provide 
drug interdiction services, help prevent cybercrime and money laundering, and combat 
terrorism. (US Customs, 2002) 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
 The DEA was formed in 1973 as a Department of Justice initiative.  This agency 
oversees all federal domestic drug enforcement programs and coordinates through offices 
abroad on international drug investigations.  The DEA employs 9,629 personnel, of 
which 4,680 are special agents.  Drug enforcement agents are tasked with discovering 
and apprehending individuals who grow, manufacture, or distribute controlled substances 
within the US.  (DEA, 2002)  DEA programs include demand reduction, marijuana 
eradication, mobile enforcement teams, and the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement 
Task Force.  The DEA also operates eight laboratories located across the US and the El 
Paso Intelligence Center, which provides security, training, and intelligence assistance 
along the southern US border.  The current major drug threats facing the US include 
methamphetamine, Ecstasy, OxyContin, and cocaine.   
Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) 
 The FBI was formed in 1908 by the US Attorney General as the investigative arm 
of the Department of Justice.  The agency consists of 30 departments and administers 56 
field offices, 400 satellite offices, and 40 foreign liaison posts staffed by 11,000 special 
agents and 16,000 support personnel.  The FBI’s investigative functions cover a variety 
of national concerns including civil rights, counterterrorism, foreign counterintelligence, 
organized crime, drug interdiction, violent crimes, major offenders, and financial crimes.  
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In addition, the FBI provides training, information services, and investigative assistance 
to local, state, other federal, and international law enforcement agencies.  The FBI’s 
information services include fingerprint identification, laboratory services, and criminal 
history files.  (FBI, 2002) 
Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) 
 The Department of Justice administers the INS, which oversees all naturalization 
functions and enforces admission standards for persons wishing to enter the US.  INS 
enforcement responsibilities include border control, port-of-entry inspections, 
detention/removal of criminal aliens, apprehension of illegal aliens, deportations, 
exclusions, and document fraud.  The INS also provides refugee and asylum services for 
the federal government.  The agency employs 29,000 personnel and administers a 
headquarters in Washington, DC, three regional offices, 33 district offices, and 21 border 
patrol sectors throughout the US as well as three district offices and 39 area offices 
outside the US.  Immigration functions have been performed by the federal government 
since 1864; however, the Immigration Act of 1891 was the first law establishing federal 
control and guidelines over immigration.  Naturalization functions were performed by the 
courts until Congress executed the Naturalization Act of 1906, taking federal control of 
all naturalization functions.  An Executive Order in 1933 combined the two functions 
under the INS, then belonging to the Department of Labor.  In 1940, INS jurisdiction was 
transferred to the Department of Justice.  Today, the INS performs over 510 million 
inspections of individuals entering the US and oversees 6,000 miles of border with 
Mexico and Canada and 250 ports of entry into the US.  In 2001, the INS apprehended 
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1,235,000 illegal aliens along the Southwest border and received 7.9 million applications 
for immigration benefits.  (INS, 2002) 
Secret Service 
 The Secret Service operates as an agency within the Department of the Treasury.  
The agency was enacted in 1865 to suppress counterfeiting activities; however, it was not 
recognized as a distinct law enforcement division until 1883.  In 1894, the agency took 
on part-time protection of the President.  After President McKinley’s assassination in 
1901, Congress requested the Secret Service protect the President full time; however, 
funding was not appropriated for these duties until the Sundry Civil Services Act of 1907 
was passed.  In 1930, the White House Police merged with the Secret Service.  The 
agency’s financial crimes duties were expanded in 1984 to include credit/debit card fraud 
and identity theft.  (US Treasury, 2002)  The Secret Service’s official mission is two-fold 
and includes the protection of the President, Vice President, their immediate families, 
heads of state, and other designated personnel.  The second mission involves law 
enforcement concerning counterfeiting and other financial crimes encompassing device 
fraud, financial institution fraud, identity theft, computer fraud, telecommunications 
fraud, and cyber crimes.  (US Treasury, 2002)  The Secret Service employs 2,100 special 
agents, 1,200 Uniformed Division officers, and 1,700 support personnel in 125 offices 
located both within the US and abroad.  (US Treasury, 2002)   
United States Marshals Service (USMS) 
 The USMS was created by the Judiciary Act of 1789, which also established the 
federal judicial system.  The agency is administered by the Department of Justice.  The 
early mission of the USMS was expansive.  They served subpoenas, summons, writs, 
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warrants, and other court documents.  The USMS rented courtrooms, hired bailiffs, 
ensured jurors were available, and kept watch over prisoners.  They represented the 
federal government at the local level and even took the national census until 1870.  
(USMS, 2002)  Today, the USMS mission includes protecting federal courts and ensuring 
the judicial system operates efficiently and within legal guidelines.  US Marshals also 
provide protection for judges, transport prisoners, execute the witness protection 
program, and manage seized assets.  The USMS is responsible for 55 percent of arrests of 
all federal fugitives.  (USMS, 2002)  The agency employs 4,000 agents and support 
personnel in 350 offices across the US, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, 
and the Virgin Islands.  (USMS, 2002)   
Other Federal Law Enforcement Agencies 
The following list includes all other federal law enforcement agencies and 
weblinks to their respective homepages: 
Environmental Protection Agency:  www.epa.gov 
 Federal Communications Commission:  www.fcc.gov 
 Federal Aviation Administration:  www.faa.gov 
 Federal Trade Commission:  www.ftc.gov 
 Financial Crimes Enforcement Division:  www.treas.gov/fincen 
 Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigative Division:  
www.treas.gov/irs/ci/index.html 
 National Security Agency:  www.nsa.gov 
 Office of the US Attorney General:  www.usdoj.gov/ag/index.html 
 Office of the Inspector General:  oig.gsa.gov 
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 Postal Inspection Service:  www.usps.gov/wesites/depart/inspect 
 Securities and Exchange Commission:  www.sec.gov 
 State Department Bureau of Diplomatic Security:  ds.state.gov/index.html 
 US Army Military Police Corps:  www.wood.army.mil/usamps/default.htm 
 US Federal Protection Service Police:  members.aol.com/usfpsfl/usfps.htm 
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Appendix B. 
Criminal Justice Information Systems 
 
 There are several criminal justice information systems currently operating across 
the US, each with a different purpose, scope, and capability.  While most of these 
systems are funded and administered at the federal level, a few regional systems, through 
cooperative efforts among state government agencies, have matured into prominent 
information-sharing tools for law enforcement agencies.  In addition, the federal 
government has commissioned many programs designed to enhance the interoperable 
capabilities of law enforcement and public safety organizations across federal, state, and 
local tiers.  Here is a brief overview of the more significant information systems and 
interoperability programs. 
Advanced Generation of Interoperability for Law Enforcement (AGILE)   
AGILE is a federal program sponsored by the National Institute of Justice, an 
agency within the Department of Justice.  One of AGILE’s research missions specifically 
focuses on interoperability capabilities at all levels of law enforcement and public safety, 
both in wireless public safety telecommunications and information technology 
applications.  AGILE’s mission statement is “to assist state and local law enforcement 
agencies to effectively and efficiently communicate with one another across agency and 
jurisdictional boundaries…helping bridge the gap in emergency communication by 
identifying, adopting, and developing interoperability solutions that include open 
architecture standards for voice, data, image, and video communication systems” 
(AGILE, 2002).  One of AGILE’s current initiatives is the INFOTECH program—the 
goal of which is to develop easy-to-use, secure information technology systems that 
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provide inter-regional information sharing capabilities among law enforcement agencies, 
while minimizing cost and federal restrictions to state and local agencies (AGILE, 2002).  
AGILE is also involved with testing state-of-the-art radio switching technologies for field 
use, developing a national program for quickly disseminating information on kidnapped 
and missing children, and providing grants/funding to state and local law enforcement 
and public safety agencies for procuring telecommunications/IT equipment and 
applications. 
Public Safety Wireless Network (PSWN) 
Information Technology initiative 04 (IT04), a product of the National 
Performance Review of 1993, prompted the program’s creation.  IT04 envisioned “the 
nationwide development of interoperable systems for all types of public safety agencies 
at the local, state, and federal levels of government” (Public Safety Wireless Networks, 
2002).  Like AGILE, PSWN is a federally funded program and remains a joint effort 
between the Departments of the Treasury and Justice to “promote effective public safety 
communication and to foster interoperability among local, state, and federal 
communication systems” (Public Safety Wireless Networks, 2002).  It is a two-phased, 
multi-year project designed to meet three primary objectives:  establish nationwide 
interoperable communications across federal, state and local tiers; establish Public Safety 
Wireless Interoperability National Standards (WINS), and maximize the effectiveness of 
interoperability assistance efforts (Public Safety Wireless Networks, 2002).  PSWN’s 
first phase concentrates on collecting information on current operations, standards, and 
best practices to form a national knowledge base.  The second phase centers on 
maintaining that knowledge base and assisting law enforcements agencies with the 
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implementation of standards developed under the WINS.  PSWN planning initiatives 
began in 1997, and the program’s execution phase (which began in early 2002) is 
projected for completion in 2006.   
Global Criminal Justice Information Network (GCJIN):   
GCJIN is administered by the Bureau of Justice Administration in the Department 
of Justice.  GCJIN envisions the ability of law enforcement officers to electronically 
access criminal justice information anytime, anywhere—even in a police cruiser after 
pulling over a suspect.  GCJIN was developed by the Global Advisory Committee, 
comprised of local, state, and federal law enforcement officers.  Like the AF Portal, 
GCJIN is an all-encompassing window into various law enforcement databases and IT 
systems.  GCJIN provides the capability to link different systems to provide complete 
access to critical criminal justice information to the law enforcement officer (Robinson, 
2002).   
Office of Law Enforcement Standards (OLES) 
OLES belongs to the Electronics and Electrical Engineering Laboratory within the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology.  In response to a national financial crisis 
among law enforcement agencies, Congress directed the Department of Justice to develop 
a program that could provide sound procurement guidance to state and local law 
enforcement agencies.  To fulfill this mandate, the Department of Justice created OLES 
in 1971 (Higgins K., 2001).  OLES’ original mission was to provide a list of equipment 
tested and approved for safe, effective use in law enforcement activities; however, OLES 
has expanded its mission in response to growing law enforcement research needs.  The 
organizational vision is “to apply science and technology to the needs of the criminal 
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justice community” (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2002), and OLES 
currently has five core program areas:  weapons and protective systems, detection and 
inspection technologies, chemical systems and materials, forensic sciences, and public 
safety communications standards (Higgins K., 2001).  OLES serves as “the principal 
agent for standards development for the criminal justice and public safety 
communities….Through its programs, OLES helps criminal justice and public safety 
agencies acquire, on a cost-effective basis, the high quality resources they need to do 
their jobs” (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2002).     
Regional Information Sharing Systems Program (RISS) 
RISS is a program administered by the Institute for Intergovernmental Research 
of the Department of Justice.  RISS contains six regional centers (see figure below) that 
operate independently, however, share information to combat criminal networks that may 
operate over vast territories such as organized crime, drug trafficking, cybercrime, 
terrorism, and gang activities (Edwards, 2002).  According to their website, RISS has 
over 6,000 members and spans across all 50 states, two Canadian provinces, the District 
of Columbia, Australia, Guam, the US Virgin Islands, England, and Puerto Rico.  
Member agencies range across all three law enforcement tiers:  over 4,000 municipal and 
county departments, 360 state agencies, and 750 federal agencies (Edwards, 2002).  
IDENT-INS 
IDENT-INS is a fingerprint catalog maintained by the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service.  IDENT-INS logs electronically recorded imprints of the index 
fingers and criminal histories of all aliens the INS has apprehended within the US 
(Dempsey, 2000).  IDENT currently contains over 400,000 records.  The system was 
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created in 1994; however, IDENT wasn’t widely distributed until 1997-1998 when 
network technology was able to support common usage.  IDENT now has over 400 
access points at border control facilities, international airports, asylums, and district 
offices.  In conjunction with IDENT’s geographical expansion, the INS conducted 
formalized training on IDENT and published standards of use for the system.  In 2000, 
IDENT and the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) 
began planning a merger between databases (Immigration and Naturalization Services, 
2002). 
National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) 
NIPC is an FBI initiative which monitors threats against critical US infrastructure 
and provides warning, response, and assessment services to local and state agencies as 
well as the private sector.  NIPC was established in 1998 and serves as the federal 
government’s focal point for threat assessment, warning, investigation, and response for 
threats or attacks against our critical infrastructures.  NIPC defines infrastructures to 
include telecommunications, banking, energy, water systems, government operations, and 
emergency systems (National Infrastructure Protection Center, 2002).  NIPC now 
encompasses one of its predecessor programs, Infragard.  Infragard was conceptualized in 
1996 when the Cleveland FBI office surveyed local computer professionals about how to 
better protect critical information systems (Infragard, 2002).  The Infragard program now 
contains 5,369 members at the federal, state, and local levels as well as in the private 
sector.   
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National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS) 
NLETS is a secure, fully redundant communications network with a standardized 
nationwide addressing scheme that provides electronic communications capability to law 
enforcement agencies.  The project began in 1966 as the Law Enforcement Teletype 
System, based on punched paper tape switching equipment technology and connected to 
all 50 states using only six telecommunications lines from headquarters in Phoenix, AZ.  
Since then, NLETS has grown into much more sophisticated computer-based message 
switching network that links local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies located 
across the US.  NLETS is the backbone for most law enforcement information-sharing 
applications and provides the capability to exchange many types of information (voice, 
video, imaging, and text).  In 1990, NLETS expanded its range to include connections 
with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Interpol (National Law Enforcement 
Telecommunications System, 2002). 
Uniform Crime Reporting/National Incident-Based Reporting System (UCR-
NIBRS) 
UCR-NIBRS is the combined efforts of two distinct, yet related, law enforcement 
data collection programs.  UCR began in the 1920s as the Uniform Crime Records 
program, initiated by the International Association of Chiefs of Police.  The UCR 
program is like a census on crime in the US and attempts to measure levels of crime by 
collecting data from over 17,000 local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies.  
UCR publishes reports and statistics on all types of crime in the US and tracks numbers 
of law enforcement officers killed or assaulted in the line of duty.  NIBRS grew out of the 
UCR program during the 1980s.  NIBRS attempted to “enhance the quantity, quality, and 
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timeliness of crime data collection by law enforcement” and to update data collection, 
storage, processing, and distribution methodologies of the original UCR program 
(Federal Bureau of Investigations, 2002). 
Law Enforcement On-Line (LEO) 
Created in 1995, LEO is a secure interactive Internet-based communication 
system for 32,500 federal, state, and local law enforcement officers (Federal Bureau of 
Investigations, 2002).  It is primarily an educational and information sharing tool using 
electronic communication applications to disseminate best practices and technological 
instruction to law enforcement professionals across the US.  LEOs capabilities include e-
mail, news groups, chat, feedback, special event calendars, electronic library, and 
distance learning (Federal Bureau of Investigations, 2002).  As LEO program coordinator 
Special Agent Craig Sorum states, “…the most important aspect of LEO is the fact that 
the Director’s been mandated to facilitate communications between state and local 
officials” (Sorum, 2002). 
National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) 
NICS was established in 1998 by the Attorney General’s Office in response to 
provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1994, requiring all licensed 
gun sales establishments to perform background checks on individuals attempting to 
purchase a firearm.  Currently, 26 states have full or partial access to NICS.  The other 24 
states must contact the FBI for NICS information (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
2002).  NICS searches four databases containing millions of criminal history records 
from all 50 states on persons who are disqualified from receiving firearms.  NICS 
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typically returns information within 30 seconds of the request (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 2002).    
National Integrated Ballistics Information Network (NIBIN) 
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms administers the NIBIN program, 
which provides ballistic identification equipment to “state and local law enforcement 
agencies for use in imaging and comparing crime gun evidence” (NIBIN, 2002).  NIBIN 
allows law enforcement agencies to share and acquire ballistic information and images on 
bullets and cartridge casings.  According to the NIBIN website, this program allows state 
and local law enforcement agenc ies access to ballistic intelligence capabilities that they 
may not be able to afford on their own.  NIBIN was initiated in 2000 as a multi-year 
project.  The NIBIN program will install ballistics identification equipment in 233 
locations positioned in major population centers across all 50 states (NIBIN, 2002).  
NIBIN’s networking capabilities allow specialists to compare ballistic information across 
jurisdictional boundaries, enabling collaborative capabilities for law enforcement 
officials to curb violent crimes (South Dakota Division of Criminal Investigation, 2002). 
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) 
CODIS is a national DNA database created in 1998 and administered by the FBI.  
CODIS is a nationally fielded, Internet-based system allowing local, state, and federal 
law enforcement agencies to exchange and compare DNA profiles.  According to the 
CODIS website, the DNA Identification Act of 1994 authorized the FBI to establish a 
national DNA index for law enforcement purposes (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
2002).  As of June 2002 CODIS contained 1,013,746 profiles, including 35,851 forensic 
profiles and 977,895 criminal offender profiles.  Ohio, for example, has contributed 
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31,768 offender profiles and 1,091 forensic samples to the system through 10 CODIS 
labs located throughout the state.  This information has aided 100 investigations (Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, 2002).   
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) 
IAFIS is the FBI’s electronic fingerprint identification database.  IAFIS was 
brought on- line in 1998 as Lockheed-Martin Corporation developed the software, 
scanners, and matching equipment needed to deploy the system.  Scanners encode a 
latent fingerprint sample which can then be electronically submitted to IAFIS.  IAFIS 
then searches its database for matches and reports any possible matches.  The FBI plans 
to make this information available to state and local agencies; however, unlike NIBIN, 
IAFIS is not a federally funded project and state/local agencies must purchase their own 
equipment (Criminal Justice Information Systems, 2002). 
Criminal Justice Information Services Wide Area Network (CJIS WAN) 
CJIS WAN describes the infrastructure supporting IAFIS.  It is a secure pipeline 
through which IAFIS data can be exchanged.  CJIS was brought on- line in 1999 and is 
still in its developmental stage.  The FBI’s short-term plans to expand CJIS services 
include the addition of DNA information sharing capabilities (Dempsey, 2000).  
Interstate Identification Index (III) 
III is a commercially developed Internet-based information-sharing tool allowing 
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to exchange criminal history, mugshot, 
and fingerprint data.  It was developed to replace the Identification Division Automated 
Services (IDAS) system, an FBI legacy system that relied on manual input and paper 
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product transfers making it inefficient.  Under IDAS, inquiry responses could take up to 
10 days to complete (SAIC, 2002).    
National Crime Information Center Network (NCIC) 
NCIC is a network of databases and services providing information on criminal 
activities, suspects, missing persons, unidentified persons, terrorist cells, and stolen 
property.  NCIC’s mission is to promptly disclose information about criminals and crimes 
in order to expedite investigations.  NCIC is administered by the FBI and contains links 
to other FBI programs such as III and LEO.  NCIC is accessible to law enforcement 
agencies in all 50 states, Puerto Rico, and all US Possessions and Territories.  Limited 
access has also been granted to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.  In the long-term, 
the FBI plans to merge NCIC with CJIS under one program (Pike, 2002) 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) 
FinCEN links federal law enforcement agencies and financial institutions in order 
to share account and transaction information that may involve terrorist activity or money 
laundering (Department of the Treasury, 2002).  FinCEN was created in 1990 by the 
Department of the Treasury under provisions included in the Bank Secrecy Act. FinCEN 
is accessible at the local, state, federal, and international levels.  The program was 
intended to create a collaborative environment for tracking criminals engaging in 
financial crimes (Department of the Treasury, 2002).   
Cyber Warning Information Network (CWIN) 
CWIN is an early warning/detection network designed by the White House Office 
of Cyberspace Security to combat cyber crime and terrorism.  CWIN links local, state, 
and federal agencies with the private sector through a national network providing 
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information sharing capabilities on emerging cyber threats.  Any individual, whether on 
the CWIN network or not, can alert any of the information sharing and assurance centers 
of a cyber attack.  These centers will then push warnings out to government and private 
organizations about the emerging threat.  Organizations would then enact operational 
plans to minimize the impact of the threat on the networks they control.  It’s a proactive 
method of decreasing the damage any one attack may inflict.  “This is a case where the 
government doesn’t know best or first.  So you need a public-private partnership to reach 
out to these nodes in the private sector….that see viruses first,” says Richard Clark, 
special adviser on cyberspace security to President Bush (Vaida, 2001). 
National Drug Pointer Index (NDPIX) 
NDPIX is administered by the Drug Enforcement Administration and was brought 
on- line in 1997.  NDPIX is available to local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies 
across the NLETS backbone.  The system allows law enforcement officials to determine 
if drug suspects are being investigated by other law enforcement organizations allowing 
transfer of vital crime information, maximizing collaborative capabilities, and 
minimizing duplication of effort (Drug Enforcement Administration, 2002).  According 
to NLETS Executive Director Timothy Sweeney, NDPIX is currently populated with 
over 120,000 suspects and leads (Drug Enforcement Administration, 2002).   
Federal law enforcement agency websites 
Each federal law enforcement agency maintains its own website with information 
pertaining to their area of expertise.  (The major federal law enforcement agencies are 
identified and briefly described in Appendix A.)  These websites also contain links to 
related sites which may contain pertinent law enforcement information.   
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Appendix C. 
History of Influential Federal Information Systems 
 
ARPANET 
The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) was formed in reaction to the 
former Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik in 1957 (Hauben, 2002), which became a 
political harbinger that the US’ technological superiority had been trounced. Though 
ARPA was a military agency, its primary focus was technological research.  Thus, many 
of the agency’s projects did not have direct battlefield applications.  In 1962, ARPA was 
directed to research command and control applications utilizing computer technology 
(Hauben, 2002).  This directive launched the development of ARPANET, commonly held 
as the forerunner of the Internet.   
 ARPA scientists teamed with researchers from US universities in a collaborative 
effort to fulfill the objectives of ARPA’s mission.  These universities included Stanford, 
the University of California at Los Angeles, the University of California at Santa 
Barbara, and the University of Utah (Hauben, 2002).  The researchers were essentially 
starting from scratch and had to create tools and concepts commonly attached to 
networking including protocols, topologies, and even the nodes upon which the network 
was implemented.  After nine years of planning, constructing and testing, ARPANET 
was brought on-line in 1971.  “After the ARPANET was up and running, the computer 
scientists using it realized that assisting human communication was the most fundamental 
advance that the ARPANET made possible” (Hauben, 2002).  Since 1971, the basic 
network that ARPA and its associates brought into being has slowly evolved into the 
Internet. 
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National Communications System (NCS) 
Development of the first federal communications system began in 1962, fueled by 
communications difficulties experienced between US government agencies, foreign 
entities, NATO, and the diplomatic corps during the Cuban missile crisis.  President 
Kennedy ordered an investigation into interoperability issues affecting US secure 
communications capabilities.  The National Security Council headed this investigation, 
which resulted in the creation of the NCS.  The system’s purpose as outlined in a 1963 
Presidential Memorandum was to “provide better communications support to critical 
government functions during emergencies…linking, improving, and extending the 
communications facilities and components of various federal agencies, focusing on 
interconnectivity and survivability” (National Communications System, 2002).  Though 
communications technology has evolved quite a bit since 1962, the purpose of NCS 
remains relatively unchanged.  In 1984, President Reagan broadened the NCS’ national 
security and emergency preparedness capabilities scope under Executive Order 12472.  
National security and emergency preparedness capabilities refer to “services used to 
maintain a state of readiness or to respond to and manage any event or crisis (local, 
national, or international) that causes or could cause injury or harm to the population, 
damage to or loss of property, or that degrades or threatens the nationa l 
security/emergency preparedness posture of the United States (National Communications 
System, 2002).  Also under this mandate, NCS membership grew from six members to 22 
(see Table A-1). 
 
 
132 
 
Table A-1:  NCS Membership  
US Department of State Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
US Department of the Treasury The Joint Staff 
US Department of Defense General Services Administration 
US Department of Justice Department of Veterans Affairs 
US Department of the Interior National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
US Department of Commerce National Security Agency 
US Department of Health and United States Postal Service 
    Human Services Federal Reserve Board 
US Department of Transportation Federal Communications Commission 
US Department of Energy Federal Emergency Management Agency 
US Department of Agriculture National Telecommunications and Information Agency 
Central Intelligence Agency  
 
Source:  National Communications System, 2002 
 
 Current NCS projects include a range of telecommunications interoperability 
initiatives.  The Shared Resources High Frequency Radio Program (SHARES) provides 
“a single, interagency emergency message handling system by bringing together existing 
HF radio resources of federal, state, and industry organizations when normal 
communications are destroyed or unavailable for the transmission of national security 
and emergency preparedness information” (National Communications System, 2002).  
The SHARES program has allocated 1,071 radio stations utilizing 215 HF frequencies for 
use in such situations. These stations are located in every US state and at 20 overseas 
locations.   
 The Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP) Program ensures that national 
telecommunications services supporting national security or emergency preparedness 
missions receive priority treatment across national infrastructure.  The TSP governing 
body also provides regulatory guidance and administrative support to the program’s two 
primary components, restoration and provisioning activities for resources contained 
within NCS national security and emergency preparedness telecommunications 
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programs.  Restoration refers to prioritizing the repair or continuance of service of TSP-
identified services before non-TSP services in order to ensure minimal interruption to 
public safety, national security, and emergency preparedness.  Provisioning refers to the 
prioritization of telecommunications service installations for TSP-identified projects over 
non-TSP telecommunications projects when it is deemed that these telecommunications 
projects are critical to continuance of effective national security and emergency 
preparedness activities (National Communications System, 2002).   
 The Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) addresses two 
denial of service issues:  disruption and congestion.  Disruption occurs when telephonic 
services are crippled due to natural disaster, power outages, cable cuts, or software 
glitches.  Congestion occurs when telecommunications circuits are loaded to capacity, 
such as the Mother’s Day Phenomenon, and calls cannot be connected due to circuit 
unavailability.  GETS is an NCS-sponsored dialing plan that utilizes Personal 
Identification Number verification methods to maintain a high likelihood of call 
completion even during severe conditions of telecommunications congestion or 
disruption.  The program supports federal, state, and local government organizations as 
well as private industry and non-profit organization personnel who hold a stake in 
national security/emergency preparedness.  GETS encompasses major long distance 
networks (AT&T, MCI, WorldCom, Sprint), government- leased networks (FTS and 
DISN), and local networks (independent local exchange carriers, cellular carriers, and 
personal communications services) (National Communications System, 2002). 
 Other NCS programs include the Advanced Intelligent Network (AIN), Alerting 
and Coordination Network (ACN), National Coordinating Center (NCC), Priority Access 
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Service (PAS), Wireless Priority Services (WPS) , and Training, Planning, and 
Operational Support (TPOS).  Information about these programs can be accessed through 
the NCS homepage at www.ncs.gov/ncs/html/ncsprojects.html.   
 The NCS was the federal government’s first endeavor to provide 
telecommunications interoperability for critical governmental functions, recognizing the 
critical nature of the ability to communicate in crisis situations.  Though NCS programs 
were first concerned with radio and telephonic interoperability and accessibility 
capabilities, the program has evolved to include network, wireless, and other emerging 
technologies.  This program continues to influence the way government organizations 
view telecommunications and interoperability capabilities at national, state, and local 
levels.   
Kansas Criminal Justice Information System (KCJIS) 
The Kansas Bureau of Investigations (KBI), a state government version of the 
FBI, pioneered the use of information technology to aid law enforcement with the 
development of the KCJIS.  According to the KBI Director, “Four years ago, Kansas 
ranked at the bottom of criminal history—we were a joke.  Now, Kansas is the only state 
allowed to send FBI criminal history information over the Internet” (Wartell, 2000).  
Since its inception in 1996, the KCJIS has been considered an influential leader in 
criminal justice information system architecture, management, and security (Rohrer, 
2001)—as evidenced by the FBI’s singular approval for KCJIS to transmit sensitive FBI 
information (such as mugshots, fingerprints, and criminal history records) across the 
Internet. 
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 The KCJIS program rose from a need recognized by the KBI to efficiently 
disburse criminal justice information to law enforcement agencies, judicial system users, 
and state government offices.  Sentencing Guidelines passed by the State of Kansas in 
1994 signaled the need for better records management in the criminal justice system.  The 
courts identified a need “to quickly access complete criminal history information for 
sentencing purposes, and at the time, it was not readily available” (Wartell, 2000).  A 
1995 audit of Kansas’ criminal history repository revealed “a large percentage of records 
not entered, inaccurate, or missing information” (Wartell, 2000).  Law enforcement 
agencies identified other problems with the transference of information within the 
criminal justice community:  limited accessibility, slow network connections, and the 
lack of imaging capability for fingerprints and mugshots.  With the emergence of web-
based technologies in the mid-1990s, the KBI realized that an electronic solution might 
best fill their needs.  Consequently, the KBI developed the following system objectives:  
(1) it would contain open system architecture, but with adequate network security, (2) 
security hardware and software would meet national standards, (3) reliability and 
availability would be guaranteed via system redundancy, (4) the system would be able to 
share data electronically with local, state, and federal criminal justice agencies, and (5) 
users would be able to access the system using common Internet service providers 
(Rohrer, 2001). 
 KCJIS is a secure Internet-based application and was implemented across the 
existing Kansas state public network, KANWIN, which can be accessed using a 
dedicated frame relay or dial-up connection—a key feature contributing to reduced 
system operational and installation costs.  These features give the system a great deal of 
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flexibility and allow KCJIS to support a variety of users with different 
telecommunications capabilities.  KANWIN services all state and local government 
agencies across the 105 counties in Kansas.  These agencies include K-12 schools, 
universities, hospitals, law enforcement organizations, and other municipal functions 
(Rohrer, 2001).  Currently, KCJIS supports over 7,000 users from law enforcement, 
judicial system, and state and local government organizations.  Because KCJIS can be 
accessed through any Internet service provider (ISP), all of Kansas’ criminal justice 
agencies can afford to use it through a virtual private network, regardless of how small 
they may be—this is especially noteworthy since many local Kansas ISPs provide free 
Internet access to government agencies (Rohrer, 2001).   
 KCJIS supports several criminal justice data systems that were operational prior 
to KCJIS’ inception.  These data systems include the Computerized Criminal History 
System which records arrest records, court dispositions, custody and supervision 
decisions, etc; the Kansas Incident-Based Reporting System which logs police incident 
reports; the Automated Fingerprint Identification System; and the Automated Statewide 
Telecommunications and Records Access Network which joins geographically separated 
law enforcement units on a single network (Wartell, 2000). 
 According to Rohrer (2001), the system has already paid for itself.  The original 
system cost the State of Kansas $675,000 to implement.  Average cost avoidance each 
year since installation has topped $2M.  Approximately half of this cost avoidance occurs 
at the local level due to decreased paper costs, less paper handling, and freeing personnel 
to accomplish other tasks than chasing criminal records.  At the state level, KBI has been 
able to install and maintain KCJIS without hiring additional staff (Rohrer, 2001). 
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 Given the sensitive nature of the information contained on the system, security is 
considered a key feature of KCJIS.  According to Rohrer (2001), “…most users choose 
passwords poorly….passwords are not safe as hackers have several tools such as 
“Cracker” and “Social Engineering” available to steal passwords.”  To remedy this, KBI 
purchased key fob tokens which choose the user’s password.  Passwords are used one 
time only, which further protects the system from stolen or intercepted passwords.  Since 
the token maintains passwords for the user, KCJIS customers are relieved from managing 
their own passwords which further simplifies system use.  These security features have 
been tested.  The criminal justice organization SEARCH attempted unsuccessfully to 
breach the system with 20 of its agents.  Additionally, the KCJIS firewall identifies and 
logs network probes on the system—none of these probes have infiltrated the system.  In 
light of this, when the FBI created their network security guidelines, they used KCJIS as 
a model for security assurance (Rohrer, 2001).   
 KCJIS has streamlined the criminal justice process in many other areas as well.  
The system has greatly reduced the time needed to retrieve criminal history records for 
court appearances.  Transaction times for completing a criminal history request have been 
drastically reduced from six weeks to ten minutes.  With KCJIS’ image processing 
capabilities, electronically stored mugshots and fingerprints have increased accuracy in 
identifying suspects.  Additionally, now that data is handled and entered at the local level, 
the accuracy of data entering the system has improved (Rohrer, 2001). 
 KCJIS remains a model for state government-sponsored criminal justice 
information systems and has catapulted the State of Kansas from the bottom of the 
technological heap to a forerunner in utilizing IT to enhance law enforcement 
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capabilities.  The project’s implementation is far more than an incremental improvement 
and has completely reengineered records management in the criminal justice community.   
The FBI’s Trilogy Project 
Even before the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the FBI had plans to 
upgrade their available infrastructure and networking capabilities to increase 
interoperability among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.  In May 2001, 
the FBI contracted out the Trilogy project, a three-year, $400M effort to upgrade 27,000 
personal computers and 350 servers at 650 locations (Dean, 2001).  The FBI’s network 
will migrate to a common operating system utilizing Microsoft products (Windows 2000, 
Outlook, and Exchange) and an Oracle database management system.  The agency’s 
LAN will be upgraded to Fast Ethernet, and the backbone will be upgraded to 
asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) technology (Dizard, 2002).  Trilogy was inspired by 
several high-profile incidents which led to the FBI’s conclusion that system upgrades 
were necessary.  Just before Timothy McVeigh, convicted of the terrorist bombing of the 
Murrah Federal Building which killed 168 people in Oklahoma City, OK, was scheduled 
to be executed, government officials discovered that more than 3,000 misplaced 
documents pertaining to the McVeigh investigation were not released to McVeigh’s 
lawyers during the discovery phase of the trial.  It was determined that the FBI’s obsolete 
information technology and records management systems contributed heavily to the 
misplacement of these documents (Dean, 2001).  McVeigh’s execution was delayed until 
the records mishap could be resolved by the courts, and the FBI and US Attorney 
General’s office took heavy criticism from Congress and the press over the situation.  
Earlier that year, the House Judiciary Committee reviewed the FBI’s computer systems.  
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In a letter to then FBI Director Louis Freeh, the committee commented that “it was 
‘concerned that the FBI has information technology systems that are slow, unreliable 
[and] obsolete—systems that are unable to address the bureau’s critical needs’” (Dean, 
2001).  The final punch came when the newly appointed FBI Director Robert Mueller 
toured the FBI facilities at FBI Headquarters in Washington, DC.  During the tour, he 
noticed a diversity of computer brands on employees’ desks, ranging from UNIX-based 
Sun Mircosystems to Apple to IBM-compatibles Compaq and Dell.  In response to his 
question about why there were so many dissimilar systems, Mueller heard that “… ‘every 
division had a separate computer system until a year or two ago’” (Puzzanghera, 2002).  
The disparity of the FBI’s departmental computer systems had led to much larger 
problems by 2001, despite that the FBI had spent over $1.7B on major IT projects since 
1993 (Puzzanghera, 2002).  Agents were unable to send emails externally from their 
desktops, electronic files could not be searched by more than a single word, and many 
computers—some located in the same building—still couldn’t talk to each other over the 
current network (Puzzanghera, 2002).  These IT deficiencies were causing serious 
detriments to productivity and mission fulfillment within the FBI, and many suspect IT 
problems may have contributed to the inability to detect clues that may have helped 
prevent the 9/11 disaster (Puzzanghera, 2002).   
 One of the assumptions in the National Strategy for Homeland Security, published 
in July 2002, is that homeland defense will rely heavily on IT and the nation’s 
infrastructure.  Information sharing across interoperable federal systems is a key asset to 
future national homeland defense strategy (Federal Computer Week, 2002).  A necessary 
component toward fulfilling the information-sharing requirement is the information 
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infrastructure necessary to enhance federal agencies’ ability to collect, store, search, 
retrieve, and analyze information (Higgins S., 2002) across networks administered by the 
myriad of organizations that operate within the homeland defense strategy.  In keeping 
with that vision, the overall direction of the Trilogy Project aims to replace the current 
“green screen” environment (which requires the user to perform 12 separate steps in 
order to simply store a document) with a windows based, point-and-click operating 
system with web-based applications (Higgins S., 2002). 
 The Trilogy Project is an important milestone in federal communications because 
every agency within the federal government suffers from similar problems.  Since 1993, 
the US government has spent over $370B on computers, software, and infrastructure.  
However, through investments in highly “customized computer systems that are 
incapable of communicating with each other” (Puzzanghera, 2002), federal organizations 
have inherited stovepiped legacy systems bereft of interoperability and interconnectivity 
qualities.  These systems severely limit the abilities of federal agencies to share 
information across network boundaries, and the only way to remedy the situation is 
through billions of dollars of further IT investments to upgrade existing networks toward 
common network environments across all agencies (no matter what department they 
belong to) that meet federal standards on IT operations.  The success of Trilogy will 
impact the futures of planned IT projects in the Coast Guard, INS, and Customs whose 
assets have been frozen until interoperability and interconnectivity concerns have been 
satisfactorily addressed (Puzzanghera, 2002). 
 After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress requested the Trilogy 
project be expedited.  The original completion date for Phase 1 of the project was set for 
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October of 2003; however, Congress would like to accelerate its completion to December 
2002 (Dizard, 2002).  Trilogy is a fully funded project, rated #24 of 39 federal IT projects 
on the FEDSIM Millenia Activity List, the GSA’s official contract IT project 
prioritization document (FEDSIM, 2002).   
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Appendix D. 
Survey Instrument 
 
 
 
Introduction:  My name is Capt David Dethlefs.  Currently, I’m obtaining my master’s degree in 
Information Systems Management from the Air Force Institute of Technology.   
 
Purpose:  My thesis research studies federal information-sharing capabilities with state and local 
LEAs.  This survey will provide a basis of understanding state and local LEA’s perception of 
the information-sharing systems provided by federal LEAs.  No personal information will be 
recorded to ensure that your answers will remain completely anonymous.  However, if you 
would like a copy of the results of this research, I’ll provide it to you upon request.   
 
How You Were Selected:  You were selected to take this survey because you belong to one of the 
organizations that have agreed to participate in this research effort:  the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police or the Fraternal Order of 
Police.   
 
Time Required:  This survey should take no longer than 15 minutes to complete.   
 
a. What state do you currently work in?  _____ 
 
 
b. Years in Law Enforcement:  ____ Years  ____ Months 
 
 
c. Primary Duty Description:  (circle one)  
 
Patrol       Investigator       Laboratory       Administration/Clerical        
 
 
Supervisor    Other 
 
  
d. Professional Organization:  (circle one) FOP  IACP   
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Section 1 
1. How frequently do you personally use each system/program listed below: 
1 – never 
2 – not very often 
3 – often 
4 – frequently 
5 – constantly  
 
         1       2        3      4       5       
 
a. AGILE (Advanced Generation of Interoperability  
for Law Enforcement) 
b. PSWN (Public Safety Wireless Network) 
c. OLES (Offices of Law Enforcement Standards) 
 
d. GCJIN (Global Criminal Justice Information Network) 
 
e. RISS (Regional Information Sharing System) 
 
f. JABS (Joint Automated Booking System) 
 
g. IDENT-INS 
h. NIPC (National Infrastructure Protection Center) 
i. UCR/NIBRS (Uniform Crime Reporting/ 
National Incident Based Reporting  System) 
j. LEO (Law Enforcement On-Line) 
k. NICS (National Instant Criminal Background  
Check System) 
l. NIBIN (National Integrated Ballistics  
Information Network) 
m. CODIS (Combined DNA Index System) 
n. IAFIS (Integrated Automated Fingerprint  
Identification System) 
o. III (Interstate Identification Index) 
p. CJIS WAN (Criminal Justice Information Services  
Wide Area Network) 
q. NCIC Net (National Crime Information Center  
Network) 
r. FinCEN (Financial Crimes Enforcement Network) 
s. NLETS (National Law Enforcement  
Telecommunications Network) 
t. NDPIX (National Drug Pointer Index) 
u. CWIN (Cyber Warning Information Network) 
v. Federal law enforcement agency websites 
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Section 2 
2. In your opinion, how effective ly does each system/program help you to accomplish your 
duties: 
1 – not useful at all 
2 – slightly useful 
3 – somewhat useful 
4 – very useful 
5 – extremely useful 
n/a – either don’t use the 
system or don’t have 
access 
 
1       2       3       4       5 
 
a. AGILE (Advanced Generation of Interoperability  
for Law Enforcement) 
b. PSWN (Public Safety Wireless Network) 
c. OLES (Offices of Law Enforcement Standards) 
 
d. GCJIN (Global Criminal Justice Information Network) 
 
e. RISS (Regional Information Sharing System) 
 
f. JABS (Joint Automated Booking System) 
 
g. IDENT-INS 
h. NIPC (National Infrastructure Protection Center) 
i. UCR/NIBRS (Uniform Crime Reporting/ 
National Incident Based Reporting System) 
j. LEO (Law Enforcement On-Line) 
k. NICS (National Instant Criminal Background  
Check System) 
l. NIBIN (National Integrated Ballistics  
Information Network) 
m. CODIS (Combined DNA Index System) 
n. IAFIS (Integrated Automated Fingerprint  
Identification System) 
o. III (Interstate Identification Index) 
p. CJIS WAN (Criminal Justice Information Services  
Wide Area Network) 
q. NCIC Net (National Crime Information Center  
Network) 
r. FinCEN (Financial Crimes Enforcement Network) 
s. NLETS (National Law Enforcement  
Telecommunications Network) 
t. NDPIX (National Drug Pointer Index) 
u. CWIN (Cyber Warning Information Network) 
v. Federal law enforcement agency websites 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
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Section 3 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements: 
         1 – completely disagree 
         2 – somewhat disagree 
         3 – neither agree nor disagree 
         4 – somewhat agree 
         5 – completely agree 
 
               1       2        3       4       5 
 
3. Federal LE information systems provide adequate support  
to my department. 
 
4. Federal law enforcement agencies allow my department  
access to necessary case-related information to complete our job 
 
5. Federal law enforcement agencies allow my department  
access to classified information to complete our job 
 
6. Federal law enforcement agencies collaborate well with  
my department through information systems 
 
7. Federal LE information system programs have taken my  
department’s capabilities into account  
 
8. I believe I have access to the federal criminal justice  
information networks I need to do my job effectively 
 
9. In this question, “flexible” refers to the ability of an  
information system to accommodate different network  
operating systems:  Federal LE information systems are  
flexible enough to support my department’s network 
 
10. Information systems technology in federal law enforcement  
agencies is behind-the-times 
 
11. I believe the information contained on federal criminal  
justice information networks is adequately protected 
 
12. I believe I get more information from federal law  
enforcement agencies through interpersonal contact than  
I get through electronic systems 
 
13. I think my department is sometimes more informed about  
situations than federal law enforcement offices 
 
14. I believe the information contained on federal criminal  
justice information networks is accurate 
146 
 
               1       2        3       4       5 
15. I believe that state-run criminal justice information  
networks typically provide more helpful information than  
federal criminal justice information networks 
 
16. I believe the information contained on federal criminal  
justice information networks is updated frequently enough 
 
17. I believe the information contained on federal criminal  
justice information networks is kept long enough 
 
18. I believe the information contained on federal criminal  
justice information networks is discarded too quickly 
 
19. Federal law enforcement agencies readily share information/ 
resources when I need/identify them 
 
20. Federal law enforcement agencies quickly respond to my  
requests for help/information. 
 
21. I trust the information I receive from federal law  
enforcement agencies 
 
22. I trust the capabilities of federal law enforcement agencies  
to gather effective intelligence about emerging threats 
 
23. I trust the federal law enforcement agencies’ abilities to  
react to emerging, critical situations 
 
24. I believe federal law enforcement agencies are prepared to  
deal with the existing level of serious national criminal activities 
 
25. I’m satisfied with federal law enforcement agencies’ day-to- 
day interactions with my department 
 
26. I believe federal law enforcement agencies are receptive  
to feedback from my department 
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Comments:  Please provide any additional comments about federal criminal justice information 
systems and/or information sharing between federal and state/local LE agencies in the area provided 
below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for completing this survey. 
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